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Abstract
Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, networking, and physical processes. Substantial
research challenges exist in the design and verification of such large-scale, distributed sensing, ac-
tuation, and control systems. Rapidly improving technology and recent advances in control theory,
networked systems, and computer science give us the opportunity to drastically improve our approach
to integrated flow of information and cooperative behavior. Current systems rely on text-based spec-
ifications and manual design. Using new technology advances, we can create easier, more efficient,
and cheaper ways of developing these control systems. This thesis will focus on design considera-
tions for system topologies, ways to formally and automatically specify requirements, and methods
to synthesize reactive control protocols, all within the context of an aircraft electric power system
as a representative application area.
This thesis consists of three complementary parts: synthesis, specification, and design. The first
section focuses on the synthesis of central and distributed reactive controllers for an aircraft elec-
tric power system. This approach incorporates methodologies from computer science and control.
The resulting controllers are correct by construction with respect to system requirements, which
are formulated using the specification language of linear temporal logic (LTL). The second section
addresses how to formally specify requirements and introduces a domain-specific language for elec-
tric power systems. A software tool automatically converts high-level requirements into LTL and
synthesizes a controller.
The final sections focus on design space exploration. A design methodology is proposed that uses
mixed-integer linear programming to obtain candidate topologies, which are then used to synthesize
controllers. The discrete-time control logic is then verified in real-time by two methods: hardware
and simulation. Finally, the problem of partial observability and dynamic state estimation is ex-
plored. Given a set placement of sensors on an electric power system, measurements from these
sensors can be used in conjunction with control logic to infer the state of the system.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Significant challenges arise in the design and verification of modern large-scale cyber-physical sys-
tems. Such systems, comprising a network of sensors, actuators, and physical systems involve the
integration of computation, networking, and dynamical processes. Equipped with both computing
and communication functionalities, design considerations need to include such aspects as (1) differing
temporal scales in underlying dynamics, (2) information flow between agents, and (3) coordination
of behavior between agents. Moreover, these systems need to rapidly react to changing environmen-
tal conditions or operational situations. Applications of cyber-physical systems appear in diverse
areas, including autonomous aircraft and vehicles, traffic monitoring and control, “energy-smart"
systems, manufacturing, and health care. The broad range of concerns amongst these applications
include intended behavior, reliability, survivability, security, and constrained energy availability.
While progress has been made in the design of large-scale cyber-physical systems within the past
few years, there is still a lack of formal design methodologies and technologies capable of providing
guarantees on behavior and execution.
Consider the application area of modern aircraft avionics (i.e., electronics applied to aviation).
Correctly designing such systems has become increasingly difficult; recent significant delays in deliv-
ery of advanced aircraft, both civil and military, have been due to unforeseen interactions between
a large number of strongly interdependent, heterogenous subsystems [17, 18, 22, 23]. Advances in
electronics technology have made the transition from conventional to more-electric aircraft (MEA)
architectures possible. More-electric aircraft architectures provide improvements in reliability and
maintainability, as well as the potential to reduce aircraft weight and volume. The concept of electric
aircraft is not new; though considered by military aircraft designers since the 1940’s, the idea was
2Figure 1.1: A comparison between the electric generation and distribution on a traditional aircraft
and on the Boeing 787 (i.e., a more-electric aircraft) [85].
never implemented due to lack of electric power generation capabilities at that time as well as volume
of required power conditioning equipment [21]. Conventional architectures utilize a combination of
mechanical, hydraulic, electric, and pneumatic subsystems. The move towards more-electric aircraft
increases efficiency by reducing power take-offs from the engines that would otherwise be needed
to run hydraulic and pneumatic components. Moreover, use of electric systems provides opportu-
nities for system-level performance optimization and decreases life-cycle costs. These architectures
also introduce, however, new high-voltage electric networks and solutions for integrating additional
subsystems.
Efforts have been made to re-use previously developed systems from conventional aircraft in
more-electric aircraft [78], but additional high-voltage networks and electrically-powered components
increase the system’s complexity, and new designs for electric power systems need to behave according
to certain properties or requirements determined by physical constraints or performance criteria.
Figure 1.1 compares the difference between a traditional aircraft electric generation and distribution
system to that of a more-electric aircraft system. Because safety of the aircraft is solely or mostly
dependent on electric power, the electric power system on next-generation aircraft need to be highly
reliable, and fault tolerant.
Analysis of all faults or errant behaviors in models is difficult due to the high complexity of
systems and subsystem interactions. The process of verifying the correctness of a system with
3respect to specifications is expensive, both in terms of cost and time, which, as a result, has led to a
greater emphasis on the use of formal methods to aid in safety and performance certification. The
cost and time to allow for design changes near the end of the design cycle increases significantly.
The growing need to rapidly and correctly design, implement, and commission large-scale systems
requires new tool and techniques in modeling, analysis, design, and verification in order to provide
a comprehensive and systematic solution to such problems.
1.2 Overview and Related Work
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop an initial framework for systematic design, specifica-
tion, and synthesis of cyber-physical systems in order to provide a mathematical, formal guarantee
of correctness of a system with respect to its requirements and desired behaviors. Within the context
of an aircraft electric power system, of particular interest are systems in which low-level dynamics
associated with hardware are integrated with high-level logics governing the overall behavior of the
system.
The research presented in this thesis consists of three main components: design, specification,
and synthesis. The following provides a quick overview of related work in each topic (presented in
reverse order).
1.2.1 Formal Methods, Verification, and Synthesis
Formal methods have been utilized extensively in the computer science and control community to
apply mathematical-based techniques to prove system correctness. Verification is a technique used
to prove correctness of a control system with respect to a specific property. The most common
forms of verification are theorem proving and model checking [20]. In model checking, the system
is represented as a finite state machine and a specification, usually expressed in a temporal logic, is
checked by efficiently searching the state space of the system. The benefit of model checking is that
the process is fully automatic. Systems, however, are limited to a finite number of states. Because
the search can be exhaustive, model checking faces a combinatorial blow-up of state space (otherwise
known as state explosion). Theorem proving, is based on defining a set of axioms and inference rules
to prove specific properties of the system. While the method is not limited to finite state systems,
it usually requires skilled human interaction.
An alternative and complementary approach that extends the verification concept is to create a
4correct-by-design control program. Automatic design of control software provides a formal guarantee
of system correctness, and can be used to reduce the time and cost of a system throughout its
development cycle. Recently developed polynomial-time algorithms exist to construct finite-state
automata from temporal logic specifications, from which automatic synthesis of digital design is
possible. These designs are capable of satisfying a large class of properties (e.g., safety, response,
liveness) in the presence of an adversarial environment [70].
Past work in the avionics field has focused on the analysis of aircraft performance and power
optimization by using modeling libraries and simulations [91, 94]. Analysis of all faults or errant
behaviors in models is difficult due to the high complexity of systems and subsystem interactions.
Verifying the correctness of aircraft and other complex systems is thus difficult because of this
intrinsic interleaving. While work has been done in this domain, verification of these systems requires
a high level of time and domain expertise. As a result, this has led to a greater emphasis on the
use of formal methods to aid in safety and performance certification. Of particular recent interest
has been in the automatic synthesis of controllers for an electric power system designed so that the
system satisfies all safety and reliability properties and requirements. The use of synthesis methods
follows from their successful integration in verification of hardware and software systems in computer
science, engineering, and robotics domains [33,38,45,48,73]. Previous work in [88] has applied formal
synthesis of control protocols to enable dynamic reconfiguration of power in more-electric aircraft.
1.2.2 Specification and Requirements Capture
Current methods for requirements capture in systems design is performed in a non-rigorous and
ad hoc manner. The Systems Modeling Language (SysML) is a general modeling language used
in systems engineering application, and supports the specification, analysis, and design of a wide
range of systems [32]. Developed in 2001 to customize the Unified Modeling Language (UML)
[79], it is capable of modeling numerous applications in hardware, software, information processes,
and facilities. Past work using SysML have included system architecture modeling, mobile phone
production, as well as aircraft vehicle management systems [7,10,69,93]. While SysML semantics are
expressive and flexible, allowing for a broad range of systems to be modeled, system requirements
are still written in a text-based format that is ambiguous to analyze.
The use of formal mathematical languages (e.g., temporal logics) has garnered great interest
due to their expressive power as well as their unambiguous meaning. An additional benefit is
that methodologies from computer science and control incorporate temporal logics in design and
5verification. While the use of formal specification languages and correct-by construction synthesis
methods is beneficial in the area of controller design, unfamiliarity of formal methods amongst
engineers may provide a challenge to widespread implementation of formal methods.
Domain-specific languages have been proposed as a way to interface between industry engineers
with domain knowledge with methods and tools used by computer scientists and software engineers.
Domain-specific languages are languages adapted to a particular application or set of tasks. While
general purpose languages (e.g., C or Java) may offer broader programming features, domain-specific
languages (e.g., HTML or Verilog) provide more expressiveness and ease of use within a given
domain [59]. Examples of languages used in the context of cyber-physical systems can be found
in [4] and [13].
1.2.3 Design Space Exploration and State Estimation
Design space exploration examines design alternatives prior to implementation. Investigating design
candidates is beneficial in many engineering tasks, including rapid prototyping, optimization, and
system integration. The main challenge of design space exploration is the state space size that must
be explored. For large system with millions (or billions) of possibilies, enumerating every choice can
be prohibitive. Previous work has used SMT solvers to solve a set of global design constraints [43]
and evolutionary algorithms for multi-objective design space exploration [87].
The process of design space exploration can benefit from the knowledge gained from state esti-
mation, which can provide feedback in determining the set of candidates to analyze or explore. State
estimation determines the current states of a system given some set of measured outputs. It has been
widely used in detection and fault identification. Autonomous control systems rely on estimation
in effective control of systems. The problem of estimating the state of a control system has been
explored by several authors as a means for solving monitoring or surveillance problems. Estimation
of electric power systems using optimization-based techniques is a well-established area [2, 16, 63].
In addition, a large body of work exists on diagnostics of electric power systems focusing on AC
systems [24], as well as large vehicle systems. [53] examines the diagnostics for the international
space station, [44] for an aircraft electric system, and [35] for a marine vehicle power system. For a
DC system, [36] uses an optimization-based approach to estimate fault states. Past work in electric
power system state estimation has focused on static, centralized estimation problems with continuous
states.
61.3 Outline and Contributions
The scope of this thesis covers the framework for systematic design, specification, and synthesis of
an aircraft electric power system. Chapter 2 provides background information on electric power
systems. It also discusses various forms of temporal logics, including linear temporal logic, the
language used mostly throughout this work, and finally introduces the formalisms for reactive and
distributed synthesis. The main contribution of Chapter 3 is application of formal specifications in
synthesizing centralized and distributed controllers for an aircraft electric power system. Addition-
ally, timed specifications, i.e. requirements in which actions must occur within a given time bound,
are formulated using linear temporal logic. Thus we present a timed version of synthesis for electric
power system.
The automatic formalization of requirements into an electric power system domain-specific lan-
guage is addressed in Chapter 4. The main contribution is an automatic specification generator
tool AES2gen that receives as inputs a set of high-level primitives and automatically synthesizes
controllers such as those described in Chapter 3. Requirements capture for various types of spec-
ifications is discussed, including ways to incorporate sequence-based specifications within an LTL
framework.
Chapters 5-6 address the design aspect of electric power systems. Chapter 5 presents a design
flow methodology for aircraft electric power systems. Multiple candidate topologies are generated
using mixed-integer linear programming, for which we then automatically synthesize controllers that
are then verified in simulation using the Breach toolbox [25]. The controllers are also implemented
on a hardware testbed within a real-time framework. Chapter 6 explores the problem of sensor
placement within an electric power system by proposing an algorithm for dynamic state estimation
based on sensor measurements. Results from the algorithm are simulated on representative electric
power system topologies. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the work and discusses directions for research
in the future.
7Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Electric Power Systems
The standard electric power system for a passenger aircraft comprises a certain number of generators
(e.g., one or two on the left and right sides of the aircraft) that serve as primary power sources.
Generators supply power to a set of loads through dedicated AC buses. Typically, each AC bus
delivers power to a DC bus through a transformer rectifier unit. Contactors are high-power switches
that can control the flow of power by reconfiguring the topology of the electric power system and can
establish connections between components. In the case of a generator or switch failure, an auxiliary
power unit (APU) or battery may be used to power buses through a different reconfiguration of
system components. Different reconfigurations of the system will change the open or closed status
of contactors and thereby affect the power level of different buses or loads.
While standard topologies (i.e., structural arrangement of components) for electric power systems
are already complex, next-generation aircraft are expected to become even more complicated, and
thus more difficult to design. The move from pneumatic and hydraulic powered systems to electric
powered ones increases the safety criticality of the electric power system. This elevated level of
criticality can potentially be compensated for by increasing the number of paths between generators
and buses that supply and deliver power to newly introduced loads. The increased number of
overall components in the electric power systems raises the complexity of design as all possible
configurations need to be considered. The number of configurations quickly goes beyond currently
available verification and testing capabilities.
82.1.1 System Components
The electric power system schematic in Figure 2.1 includes a combination of generators, contac-
tors, buses, and loads, transformers, and rectifier units. The following is a brief description of the
components referenced in the primary power distribution single-line diagram [62].
Generators: AC generators can operate at either high voltages, which can connect to the
high-voltage AC buses, or low voltages, which feed directly to the low-voltage buses.
Buses: High-voltage and low-voltage AC and DC buses deliver power to a number of sub-buses,
loads, or power conversion equipment. Depending on the power availability and quality requirements
on the loads, these buses can be classified as essential or non-essential. For example, essential buses
supply loads that should always remain powered, such as the flight actuation subsystem, while
non-essential buses have loads that may be shed in the case of a fault or failure, such as cabin
lighting.
Contactors: Contactors are high-power electronic switches that connect the flow of power from
sources to buses and loads. Depending on the power status of generators and buses, contactors can
reconfigure, i.e., switch between open and closed. Contactors provide the actuation for reconfigura-
tion of the topology of the electric power system, hence, changing the paths through which power is
delivered from generators to loads depending on the contingencies.
Transformer Rectifier Units: Rectifier Units (RUs) convert three-phase AC power to DC
power. Transformer Rectifier Units (XFMRs) combine a rectifier unit and a step-down transformer
to additionally lower the voltage.
Batteries: Batteries are used as an electrical storage medium independent of primary generation
sources. They provide short-term power during emergency conditions while alternative sources are
being brought online.
RAM Air Turbine: The RAM Air Turbine (RAT) is a part of the emergency power system,
and is a special purpose generator that becomes active with the loss of a number of main generators.
2.1.2 System Description
The following provides a brief description of the electric power system topology in Figure 2.1.
At the top of the diagram are six AC generators: two low-voltage, two high-voltage, and two
APUs. Each engine connects to a high-voltage AC generator and a low voltage AC emergency
generator. The high-voltage APU-mounted generators, hereafter referred to as auxiliary generators
can also serve as backup power sources if a main generator fails.
9Figure 2.1: Single line diagram of an electric power system adapted from a Honeywell, Inc. patent
[60]. Two high-voltage generators, two APUs, and two low-voltage generators serve as power sources
for the aircraft. Depending on the configuration of contactors, power can be routed from sources to
buses through the contactors, rectifier units, and transformers. Buses are connected to subsystem
loads. Batteries can be used to provide emergency backup power to DC buses.
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The three distinct panels directly below the generators contain the high-voltage AC distribution
system. Each panel represents the physical separation of components within the aircraft. We
denote components that can connect or disconnect from each other through the opening or closing
of contactors as selectively connected (i.e., connected through a contactor). The four high-voltage
AC buses can be selectively connected to all HVAC generators and auxiliary generators as well as
each other by way of contactors (represented by a`).
Selectively connected to the four high-voltage AC buses are four high-voltage rectifier units
(HVRUs) that transform AC power to DC power. HVRU 1 and HVRU 2 are directly connected to
high-voltage DC Bus 1; HVRU 3 and HVRU 4 are directly connected high-voltage DC Bus 2. Each
high-voltage DC bus also has a battery source which can also be selectively connected.
High-voltage AC Bus 2 and Bus 3 are also selectively connected to a set of transformers (labeled
as XFMR on the single-line diagram) that convert high-voltage AC power to low-voltage AC power.
The low-voltage AC system is depicted in the two panels in Figure 2.1 just below the high-voltage
AC panels. These two transformers are connected to a set of four low-voltage AC buses. LVAC ESS
Bus 1 and LVAC ESS Bus 2 are essential, meaning that they connect to loads which must always be
powered. These essential buses are also selectively connected to the two low-voltage AC emergency
generators in the case of a failure from the HVAC side.
The low-voltage AC essential buses are directly connected to low-voltage rectifier units (labeled
as LVRU on the single-line diagram) converting low-voltage AC to low-voltage DC, as shown in the
two bottom panels in Figure 2.1. There are four low-voltage DC buses, as well as two batteries
which may also be selectively connected. Power can also be routed from the high-voltage AC buses
through transformers to LVDC Main Bus 1 and LVDC Main Bus 2. Similar to the low-voltage AC
case, low-voltage DC essential buses must remain powered at all times throughout the flight because
of essential loads attached to the buses.
2.2 Temporal Logic
2.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic
Temporal Logic is an extension of propositional logic that incorporates notions of temporal ordering
to reason about correctness over a sequence of states [9, 30, 39]. First introduced as a specification
language by Pnueli [72] in the 1970s, it has since been demonstrated to be an appropriate formalism
to reason about various kinds of systems, in particular in concurrent programs. The use of temporal
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logics to formally specify and verify behavioral properties has been seen in various applications,
including embedded systems, robotics, and controls [73].
In reactive systems (i.e., systems which react to a dynamic, a priori unknown environment),
correctness will depend not only on inputs and outputs of a computation, but on execution of the
system as well. Temporal logic is a formalism well-suited for these types of problems in which the
system must react to an adversary or environment. In this thesis we consider a version of temporal
logic called linear temporal logic (LTL) that is suitable for describing certain properties of electric
power systems. Other forms of temporal logic may be more or less expressive than LTL, depending
on the desired behavior of the system. A brief overview of other languages is discussed in Section
2.2.2.
Before describing LTL, we begin by defining an atomic proposition, the basic building block of
LTL. An atomic proposition is defined based on the variable structure of a system, as follows.
Definition 1: A system consists of a set V of variables. The domain of V , denoted dom(V ), is
the set of valuations of V . A state of the system is an element v ∈ domV .
Definition 2: An atomic proposition is a statement on a valuation v ∈ dom(V ) with a unique
truth value (True or False) for a given v. Let the valuation v ∈ dom(V ) be a state of the system, and
p be an atomic proposition. Then v  p, read v satisfies p, if p is True at that state v. Otherwise,
v 6 p.
In the electric power system domain, the set of variables includes, for instance, generator and
contactor statuses. Valuations of these variables include the health values of generators. An atomic
proposition could state that each generator in the system be healthy.
Alongside atomic propositions, LTL also includes Boolean connectors like negation (¬), disjunc-
tion (∨), conjunction (∧), material implication (→), and two basic temporal modalities next (#) and
until ( U ). By combining these operators and propositions, it is possible to specify a wide range of
requirements on the desired behavior of a system and environment assumptions. Given a set pi of
atomic propositions, an LTL formula is defined inductively as follows:
• any atomic proposition p ∈ pi is an LTL formula;
• given LTL formulas ϕ and ψ over pi, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, #ϕ and ϕ U ψ are also LTL formulas.
Given a set of valuations and a set pi of atomic propositions over valuations v ∈ dom(V ), LTL
formulas over pi are interpreted over infinite sequences of states. For example, the formula #ϕ holds
for a sequence of states at the current step of the sequence if ϕ is true in the next step. The formula
12
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Figure 2.2: Semantics of LTL temporal modalities. Propositions are reasoned about over entire
sequences of states. In the first sequence, atomic proposition p is true for the initial state, denoted
by a p above the first state in the sequence. In the second sequence, p holds in the second state,
or next step. In the third sequence, p is true until the step when q becomes true. In the fourth
sequence, p is eventually true at some step. In the last sequence, p is true for every step. A state
without a label contains an arbitrary set of propositions.
ϕ1 U ϕ2 holds at the current step if at some future step ϕ2 holds and ϕ1 holds at all steps until that
future step.
Formulas involving other operators can be derived from these basic ones. The until operator can
be used to derive two further temporal modalities that are used commonly in LTL, namely eventually
(3) and always (). The formula 3ϕ states that ϕ will be true at some point in the future, while
ϕ is satisfied if and only if ϕ is true for all points. Figure 2.2 illustrates some temporal modalities
that can be expressed in LTL. On the left-hand side are LTL formulas over propositions p and q,
while on the right are sequences of states.
More formally, the semantics of LTL is given as follows. Let σ = v0v1v2 . . . be an infinite sequence
of valuations of variables in V , and ϕ and ψ be LTL formulas. We say that ϕ holds at position i ≥ 0
of σ, written vi |= ϕ, if and only if ϕ holds for the remainder of the execution σ starting at position
i. Then, the satisfaction of ϕ by σ is inductively defined as:
• for atomic proposition p, vi |= p if and only if vi  p;
• vi |= ¬ϕ if and only if vi 6|= ϕ;
• vi |= ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if vi |= ϕ or vi |= ψ;
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• vi |= #ϕ if and only if vi+1 |= ϕ; and
• vi |= ϕ U ψ if and only if ∃ k ≥ i such that vk |= ψ and vj |= ϕ for all j, i ≤ k < j.
Based on this definition, #ϕ holds at position i of σ if and only if ϕ holds at the next state vi+1,
ϕ holds at position i if and only if ϕ holds at every position in σ starting at position i, and 3ϕ
holds at position i if and only if ϕ holds at some position j ≥ i in σ.
Let Σ be the collection of all sequences of valuations of V . Then, a system composed of the
variables V is said to satisfy ϕ if σ |= ϕ for all σ ∈ Σ. A set of models Σ satisfies ϕ, denoted by
Σ |= ϕ, if every model in Σ satisfies ϕ.
Examples of LTL formulas: Given a propositional formula, common and widely used properties
can be defined in terms of their corresponding LTL formulas as follows.
Safety: Safety formulas assert that a state or sequence of states will not be reached. In particular,
we use a subclass of safety formula referred to as invariants throughout this paper. Invariant formula
assert that a property will remain true throughout the entire execution σ for all executions σ ∈ Σ.
Safety properties ensure that nothing bad will happen. A safety specification for the electric power
system could take the form (¬bus_i_unpowered) where i is the bus index.
Progress: Progress formula guarantee that a property holds infinitely often in an execution σ.
This property ensures that the system will make progress. For example, always eventually ensure
that Bus 1 is powered can be written as:  3gen_i_powered.
Response: A response formula states that at some point in the execution following a state
where a property is true, there exists a point where a second property is true. Response prop-
erties can be used to describe how systems need to react to changes in environment or operating
conditions. A response property can be used to describe how the system should react to a gen-
erator failure. If a generator fails, then at some point a corresponding contactor should open:
((gen_j_not_healthy)→ 3(contactor_k_open)) where j, k represent indices for generators and
contactors, respectively.
Remark 1 Properties typically studied in the control and hybrid system domains are safety and
stability. LTL can express a more general class of properties. Typical specifications seen with electric
power systems or more-electric aircraft in general involve safety (avoid unsafe configurations) and
response (if a failure occurs, then reconfigure). Progress properties are not used since systems do not
typically have a “goal" state that needs to be reached, but instead consist of a set of safe operational
states. We use a combination of response and modified progress formulas in order to capture timing
properties.
14
2.2.2 Other Temporal Logics
LTL is one form of temporal logic capable of expressing desired system behaviors. LTL is called
linear due to the qualitative notion of time as path-based. Each moment of time has a unique
possible successor state. LTL can state properties over all possible computations beginning from a
state. It cannot, however, easily reason about some of the possible computations. To address such
difficulties, Computation Tree Logic (CTL), was introduced by Clarke and Emerson [19]. CTL is a
branching temporal logic, with a branching notion of time. At each moment there may be several
different futures.
Real-time variants of temporal logic aim to express properties of systems with real-time specifi-
cations (e.g. p must be true within t seconds). While LTL and CTL can reason about ordering of
events, they cannot specify the exact time an event must occur. Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [46]
and timed CTL (TCTL) [6] are thus extensions of LTL and CTL, respectively, with additional clocks
and clock constraints. for LTL and CTL, there exists an implicit time bound on operators always,
eventually, and until such that
 .= [0,∞),
3 .= 3[0,∞),
U .= U [0,∞).
MTL and TCTL modify the time interval from (0,∞] to [i, j] for i, j ∈ Z.
2.3 Reactive Synthesis
We now, equipped with LTL as a specification language, formally state the reactive synthesis prob-
lem. Let E and P be sets of environment and controlled variables, respectively. Let s = (e, p) ∈
dom(E) × dom(P ) be a state of the system. Consider a LTL specification ϕ of assume-guarantee
form
ϕ = ϕe → ϕs, (2.1)
where, roughly speaking, ϕe is the conjunction of LTL specifications that characterizes the assump-
tions on the environment and ϕs is the conjunction of LTL specifications that characterizes the
system requirements.
The synthesis problem is then concerned with constructing a strategy, i.e., a partial function
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Figure 2.3: A portion of the resulting controller automaton for a synthesized problem. Dotted arrows
represent transitions to states not depicted within the figure. Listed within each node is a valuation
of environment and system variables. From state 1, an environment input determines whether the
automaton moves to state 2 or state 3.
f : (s0s1 . . . st−1, et) 7→ pt, that chooses the move of the controlled variables based on the state
sequence so far and the behavior of the environment so that the system satisfies ϕs as long as
the environment satisfies ϕe. The synthesis problem can be viewed as a two-player game between
the environment and the controlled plant: the environment attempts to falsify the specification in
(2.1) and the controlled plant tries to satisfy it. Figure 2.3 shows a portion of an example resulting
automaton. Each state (node) represents a tuple of the current valuation of system and environment
variables. State 1, for example, contains the initial states of both environment and system (where
values are only partially listed in the figure). The system variable at the next step is determined
by the environment. From state 1, if the environment determines that GL and GR are set both
to 0, then the automaton goes to state 2, and the system variables C1 and C6 become 0. If the
environment takes the transition from state 1 to state 3, then the system becomes C1 = 1 and
C6 = 0.
For general LTL, it is known that the synthesis problem has a doubly exponential complexity
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in [73]. For a subset of LTL, namely generalized reactivity (1) (GR(1)), Piterman et al., have shown
that it can be solved in polynomial time (polynomial in the number of valuations of the variables in
E and P ) [70]. GR(1) specifications restrict ϕe and ϕs to take the following form, for α ∈ {e, s},
ϕα := ϕ
α
init ∧
∧
i∈Iα1
2ϕα1,i ∧ ∧
i∈Iα2
23ϕα2,i, (2.2)
where ϕαinit is a propositional formula characterizing the initial conditions; ϕ
α
1,i are transition rela-
tions characterizing safe, allowable moves and propositional formulas characterizing invariants; and
ϕα2,i are propositional formulas characterizing states that should be attained infinitely often. Many
interesting temporal logic specifications can be expressed or easily transformed into GR(1) specifi-
cations. See [15,70,88,89] for a more precise treatment of GR(1) synthesis and case studies in which
GR(1) synthesis has been used for applications including hardware synthesis, motion planning for
autonomous vehicles, and vehicle management systems.
Given a GR(1) specification, the digital design synthesis tool implemented in JTLV (a framework
for developing temporal verification algorithm) [74] generates a finite automaton that represents a
switching strategy for the system. The temporal logic planning (TuLiP) toolbox, a collection of
python-based code for automatic synthesis of correct-by-construction embedded control software
provides an interface to JTLV [90]. For examples discussed in this thesis, we primarily use TuLiP.
Additional two-player temporal logic game solvers include Anzu [42], Lily [40], Acacia [31], and
Unbeast [29]. Anzu implements a GR(1) game solver symbolically. Lily accepts arbitrary LTL
specifications and partially alleviates the resulting high computational cost through optimizations
of the intermediate steps in the implementation [41]. Acacia and Unbeast focus on the concept of
bounded synthesis from [82] and [27], respectively. See [28] for a detailed comparison of these tools.
Finally, for temporal logic specifications in the form of safety formulas, it may be possible to obtain
performance improvements by exploring solvers that are optimized to fragments (potentially more
restrictive than GR(1)) of LTL, e.g., see [86].
2.4 Distributed Synthesis
In centralized control protocols the controller has access to measurements of all controlled and
environment variables, and is able to determine the evolution of all controlled variables in order to
satisfy a set of specifications. Because of their scale and complexity, control architectures for electric
power systems on more-electric aircraft will likely have distributed structures. Reasons for migrating
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to distributed control architectures include:
Hardware challenges: A centralized controller onboard an aircraft requires wiring from a central
processing unit to all components. The total length of wire can significantly increase the weight of
the aircraft. Local controllers allows for shorter wires and increased efficiency due to this reduction
in weight.
Increased resilience to failure: By distributing the implementation of the controller, the elec-
tric power system can be more robust to failures, i.e., if one portion of the electric power system
malfunctions, the other sections are unaffected and can still be fully operational.
Reduction of computational complexity: With an increased number of electric components, the
combination of configurations the controller must account for quickly becomes intractable for cur-
rent verification and synthesis tools as well as testing. A distributed controller design correctly
decomposes the design task into smaller subproblems each of which may be easier to cope with.
Advantages from the distribution of the control design come with increased importance of reason-
ing about the interfaces between the controlled subsystems. There is relatively extensive literature
on compositional reasoning [31, 54, 64]. Here, we follow the exposition from recent work in [67].
Figure 2.4 illustrates the decomposition of global specifications into local specifications. For ease of
presentation, consider the case where the system SYS is decomposed into two subsystems SYS1 and
SYS2. For i = 1, 2, let Ei and Pi be the environment variables and controlled variables for SYSi
such that P1∪P2 = P and P1∩P2 = ∅. Let ϕe1 and ϕe2 be LTL formulas containing variables in E1
and E2, respectively. Similarly, let ϕs1 and ϕs2 be LTL formulas in terms of E1 ∪ P1 and E2 ∪ P2,
respectively. If the following conditions hold
1. any execution of the environment that satisfies ϕe also satisfies (ϕe1 ∧ ϕe2),
2. any execution of the system that satisfies (ϕs1 ∧ ϕs2) also satisfies ϕs, and
3. there exist two control protocols that realize the local specifications (ϕe1 → ϕs1) and (ϕe2 →
ϕs2),
then, by a result in [67], implementing these two control protocols together leads to a system where
the global specification ϕe → ϕs is met.
Two factors should be taken into account when choosing local environment and controlled vari-
ables E1, E2, P1, and P2 and the local specifications. The first is the size of the state space involved
in the local synthesis problems. If the possible valuations of variables involved in local specifications
are substantially less than the possible valuations of the variables in the global specification, then
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Figure 2.4: A schematic for the decomposition of global specifications into distributed controllers for
two subsystems. The overall environment assumptions ϕe and system guarantees ϕs are distributed
into the two subsystems SYS1 and SYS2. Each subsystem has its own local environment assumptions
and system guarantees. In addition, SYS1 has an extra set of local guarantees φ1 that interact with
SYS2 as environment assumptions φ′1, while SYS2 guarantees contained in φ2 act as environment
assumptions φ′2 for SYS1.
distributed synthesis would be computationally more efficient than the centralized one (assuming
the lengths of LTL formulas for the global and the local speciÞcations are of the same order). The
second factor is the conservatism of the distributed synthesis. It is possible that even if the central-
ized problem is realizable, the local distributed synthesis may be unrealizable. Subsystems may need
to interact with each other through shared variables (either information or physical values) in order
to become realizable. As seen in Figure 2.4, subsystem SYS1 provides additional guarantees φ1 to
subsystem SYS2, evaluated as an environment assumption and denoted as φ′1. The same interaction
applies to the interface between SYS2, which sends its own local guarantees φ2 to SYS1. If the
following local specifications (and interface refinements) hold:
φ′2 ∧ ϕe1 → ϕs1 ∧ φ1, (2.3)
φ′1 ∧ ϕe2 → ϕs2 ∧ φ2. (2.4)
Then the global specification ϕe → ϕs is realizable. Indeed, let sets of executions be defined as
σe = {σ | σ |= ϕe}; ϕe′ = {σ|σ |= (ϕe1 ∧ ϕe2)};
σs = {σ | σ |= ϕs}; ϕs′ = {σ|σ |= (ϕs1 ∧ ϕs2)}.
19
Condition 1 implies that Σe′ ⊇ Σe, whereas condition 2 implies that Σs′ ⊆ Σs. Local variables and
specifications should be chosen so that conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Moreover, the conservatism
can be reduced by choosing ϕej and ϕsj such that Σe′ is as “small" as possible, and the set Σs′ is as
“large" as possible in the sense of set inclusion.
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Chapter 3
Synthesis of Reactive Control
Protocols with Timing
3.1 Overview
Controllers for an electric power system must be designed so that the system satisfies all safety and
reliability properties and requirements. These requirements are usually text-based lists, oftentimes
ambiguous in intent or inconsistent with each other. The process of verifying the correctness of a
system with respect to specifications is expensive, both in terms of cost and time. In the following
chapter, we “specify and synthesize” a solution to the design problem instead of “design then verify.”
In this approach, we begin by converting text-based system specifications for an electric power
system into a mathematical formalism using a temporal logic specification language. From the set of
system specifications, we then automatically synthesize centralized and distributed controllers, and
examine design tradeoffs between different control architectures.
One of the challenges in automatically synthesizing controllers is its computational complexity.
For a certain class of properties, a fragment of LTL known as Generalized Reactivity (1), a dis-
crete planner can be automatically computed in polynomial time (with respect to the size of the
state space) [70]. Applications of synthesis tools, however, are limited to small problems due to
the state space explosion issue. To address this challenge, we utilize previous work on the composi-
tional design of correct-by-construction, distributed protocols for an electric power system [67, 68].
Distribution of the design and implementation of the electric power system will reduce the com-
putational complexity, as well as allow for the design of flexible control architectures in terms of
modularity, fault-tolerance, and integrability [51]. The drawbacks to distributed architectures are
in the coordination between subsystems and ensuring that overall system requirements are satisfied.
Distributing system requirements introduces the notion of incompleteness in specifications (i.e., the
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lack of a guarantee subsystem requirements satisfy global specifications.) In addition, distributed
controllers can be overly conservative (e.g., more generators need to be utilized in order to guarantee
power to buses).
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the standard high-level specifications
for an electric power system. Formalized LTL specifications are presented in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 addresses how actuation delays are captured. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present the setup and results
for a case study topology for both central and distributed controllers. Section 3.6.3 presents some
benchmarks based on timing delays.
3.2 Specifications for Aircraft Electric Power Systems
Given a topology of an electric power system like that of the single-line diagram in Figure 2.1,
the main design problem becomes determining all correct configurations of contactors for all flight
conditions and faults that can occur in the system. For a configuration to be “correct” means that
it satisfies system requirements, also referred to as specifications. We now discuss a few sample
specifications relevant to the problems found in Figure 2.1.
Specifications are generally expressed in terms of safety, performance, and reliability properties.
A few common ones considered in the typical electric power system control protocol design problem
are listed below.
Safety: Safety specifications constrain the way each bus can be powered and the length of time
it can tolerate power shortages. Increasing the number of generators operating at the same time
increases the amount of power available to the electric power system. In order for AC generators
to work in parallel with each other, however, they need to match their respective frequencies, and
phase voltages. A mismatch in these properties can lead to loss of availability and even damage of
the generator or distribution system. To avoid such difficulties of synchronization, we disallow any
paralleling of AC sources, i.e., no bus should be powered by multiple AC generators at the same
time.
Essential loads, such as flight critical actuators, are connected to essential AC and DC buses.
These loads should never be unpowered for more than 50 msec. The 50 msec specification is a
number used in industry standards in most aircraft power requirement documents. This “gap” time
is short enough to ensure that load profiles are undisturbed (for safety of the aircraft), but is long
enough for contactors to open or close and still avoid paralleling of sources.
The system is reconfigured through a series of changes in the contactor states. The time it
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Table 3.1: Source Priority Table for HVAC Buses
Priority Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4
1 G2 G3 G4 G5
2 G5 G2 G5 G2
3 G3 G5 G2 G4
4 G4 G4 G3 G3
takes for contactors to switch configurations will vary due to physical hardware constraints. Typical
opening times can range between 10-20 msec, while closure times are between 15-25 msec [62]. Such
delays need to be considered due to timing constraints on the buses and non-paralleling of sources.
Remark 2 Specifications for DC components in the electric power system are the same as those
described by the AC specifications except for two simplifications: (1) The non-paralleling of AC
sources specification may be ignored, and (2) no DC bus may ever be unpowered.
Performance: Performance specifications rank desired system configurations. A generator
priority list is assigned to each bus specifying the order of sources each bus should be powered . If
the first priority generator is unavailable, then it will be powered from the second priority generator,
and so on. A hypothetical prioritization list is shown in Table 3.1 for HVAC Bus 1. Because G2 is the
first priority on the list, if the left high-voltage generator from Figure 2.1 is healthy, then HVAC BUS
1 receives power from that generator. If G2 is unhealthy, then HVAC BUS 1 should receive power
its second priority G5, and so forth. These source priority tables are usually created manually, or
borrowed from legacy systems. Thus, there is no guarantee on feasibility of all configurations or may
not cover all possible conditions. Moreover, as there is no explicit priority between buses connected
to generators, priority tables are oftentimes be contradictory. The end goal is to replace tables,
which are designed with an implicit metric, with an explicit ”cost function” or metric written as a
formal specification.
Reliability: Reliability specifications describe the bounds on probability of failures within the
system. Every component comes with a reliability level. A level  of reliability, for example, indicates
that one failure will occur every 1 hours of operation. Given multiple component failures, systems
should be designed to tolerate any combination of component faults that has a joint probability
of more than a certain pre-specified level. Practically, these reliability specifications determine the
combination of simultaneous faults that need to be accounted for by the control protocol. An electric
power system should still be able to satisfy its safety specifications given any combination of faults
that lead to the pre-specified level. In the design procedure proposed in subsequent sections, reli-
ability specifications are implicitly accounted for through the environment assumptions by limiting
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the number of generator faults that are allowed to occur at each step. If each component has a
known failure rate, then no combination of failures can exceed a rate of, 10−9, for example.
3.3 Formal Specifications For Aircraft Electric Power Systems
Given the topology in Figure 2.1, the following list details the temporal logic specifications that
typically exist in the synthesis of control protocols for electric power systems.
Environment Assumptions: Let G represent the set of all generators in the electric power
system topology. Let the Boolean variable g denote the health status of generatorG ∈ G. That is, the
lowercase symbol represents the health status of generator denoted by the corresponding uppercase
symbol. We use a similar convention between upper and lowercase symbols in the remainder of the
paper. The environment assumption states that at least one generator must be healthy, i.e., have a
status of 1, at any given time. This is written as

{∨
G∈G
(g = 1)
}
. (3.1)
Unhealthy Generators: An unhealthy generator connected to the system could create a short-
circuit failure, generate excess torque, cause overheating, or possible fires. We require any contactor
adjoining a generator to open when that generator becomes unhealthy. Let C represent the set
of all contactors in the electric power system. For G ∈ G, let CG ⊆ G be the contactors directly
neighboring G. In Figure 3.1, for example, the sets CG1 and CG2 consist of contactors C1 and C2,
respectively. For a contactor C, let c be its status (for example, 0 represents an open contactor, 1 a
closed contactor). Furthermore, the Boolean variable c˜ denotes the controller command (intent) for
contactor C. Note the difference between status of contactor, denoted by c and intent of contactor
c˜. Once the intent c˜ gets set, that command then gets executed, i.e., status c follows c˜ at a possibly
later time step.
If a generator becomes unhealthy, then the contactors connecting to it should be commanded
open, i.e., take the value of 0. The specification for disconnecting an unhealthy generator can be
written as ∧
G∈G

{
(g = 0)→
∧
C∈CG
(c˜ = 0)
}
. (3.2)
No Paralleling of AC Sources: One way to avoid paralleling AC sources is to explicitly
enumerate and eliminate all configurations in which buses can be powered from multiple sources.
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B1! B2!
G1!
C1! C2!
C3!
G2!
Figure 3.1: A single-line diagram with two generators, two buses, and three contactors. Paralleling
of AC sources can occur if all three contactors C1, C2, and C3 are all closed.
In the example shown in Figure 3.1, paralleling could occur if contactors C1, C2, and C3 were
all closed at the same time. A specification would then be to never allow all contactors along a
path to close at the same time if that path could connect two AC sources. This “global" approach
requires enumerating all possible paths between pairs of AC sources, with the number of paths and
components increasing as the topology becomes more complex.
We take a “localized” view on specifications that no AC bus can be simultaneously powered from
multiple sources. Instead of examining entire paths connecting generators to buses, we focus on the
source of power coming into or flowing out of each bus. We first introduce the notion of power flow
direction in contactors, and then examine the flow direction at each bus.
Power flow direction is defined for contactors directly connecting two buses. Contactors connect-
ing generators to buses are assumed to only allow power to flow in one direction from generator to
bus. (Note that while this assumption is valid for this problem formulation, in reality the contactor
must respond in a manner to avoid backfeeding power into a generator.) Let the set CB ⊂ C be the
set of all contactors that directly connect two AC buses. Let each bus connected to a contactor in
CB represent a “side” or direction from which power can flow into or out of, and denote them as
direction 1 and direction -1. In Figure 3.1, for example, contactor C3 directly connects buses B1
and B2, which are located on side 1 and -1 of C3, respectively. Consider contactor C ∈ CB . The
variable c˜ is the intended status of the contactor, and can take values of {−1, 0, 1} corresponding to
a closed contactor with power flowing into side -1, an open contactor, and a closed contactor with
power flowing into side 1, respectively. Note that the status of contactors connecting generators is
Boolean, while the status of contactors connecting two AC buses can take three values.
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B3! B4!B1! B2!
G2! G3! G4!G1!
C!
Figure 3.2: A single-line diagram depicting contactor C and its connecting two buses B2 and B3, as
well as neighboring nodes in N (B−1C ) and N (B1C).
For C ∈ CB , let B1C denote the bus on side 1 of contactor C, and B−1C the bus on side -1 of
contactor C. The set N (B1C) contains all nodes, defined as either a bus or a generator, that are
directly connected to the bus on side 1 of contactor C. Similarly, N (B−1C ) is the set of nearest
nodes connected to the bus on side -1 of contactor C. Sets N (B1C) and N (B−1C ) do not include any
contactors. For any bus B, let the Boolean variable b represent its power status (0 for unpowered, 1
for powered). Consider contactor C in Figure 3.2, where B1C = B3, B
−1
C = B2, N (B1C) = {G3, B4},
and N (B−1C ) = {G2, B1}.
The direction of power flow through a contactor is defined by identifying the status of buses
directly connected to a contactor, and neighboring components N (B) of those buses. For each
component X ∈ N (B1C) or X ∈ N (B−1C ), x is the status. For contactors C ∈ Cb, if no node in
N (B1C) is powered or healthy (depending on whether the node is a bus or generator, respectively),
then C cannot direct power from side 1 to side -1 (i.e., c˜ cannot be 1). Alternatively, if no node in
N (B−1C ) is powered or healthy, then C cannot direct power from side -1 to side 1 (i.e., c˜ should not
be -1). Specifications for contactor directionality can be written as the following.
If the bus on side 1 of contactor C is unpowered and none of its neighboring nodes are powered,
then its states should be set to −1 (cannot direct power from side 1):
∧
C∈Cb

¬
(b1C = 1) ∧ ∨
X∈N (B1C)
(X = 1)
→ ¬ (c = −1)
 . (3.3)
If the bus on side -1 of contactor C is unpowered and none of its neighboring nodes are powered,
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B!
B!
C!
Figure 3.3: A portion of the single-line diagram from Figure 2.1. Non-paralleling specifications are
written from the “local" viewpoint of each bus. Bus B is on side -1 of contactor C−1B , and on side
1 of contactor C1B . No combination of two contactors can be connected (and directing power into a
bus) at the same time.
then its states should not be set to 1 (cannot direct power from side -1):
∧
C∈Cb

¬
(b−1C = 1) ∧ ∨
X∈N (B−1C )
(X = 1)
→ ¬(c = 1)
 . (3.4)
Once contactor directionality is established, specifications for non-paralleling of AC sources can
be examined at the “local" level by considering each individual AC bus. Let BAC be the set of AC
buses. We now consider every combination of contactors for which power may flow into the same
bus. Consider again the set CG ⊂ C to be the set of all contactors connecting bus to a neighboring
generator. In Figure 2.1, each bus has, at most, three contactors through which power can flow
into the bus. The following specifications are written for this case, and may be generalized for any
number of contactors through which power can flow into a bus. For each bus B ∈ BAC , let each
contactor C 6∈ CG connected to B represent a “side" or direction of B. In typical configurations only
two directions are needed, though this method can be generalized for more sides. For bus B that is
on side 1 of a contactor, denote that contactor as C1B . Denote contactor C
−1
B as the contactor for
which bus B is on the -1 side. We disallow any cases where power can flow into the bus through
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multiple paths. These specifications can be written as
∧
B∈BAC
¬
∨
G∈N (B),C∈CG
[
(c = 1) ∧ (c1B = 1)
]
,
∧
B∈BAC
¬
∨
G∈N (B),C∈CG
[
(c = 1) ∧ (c−1B = −1)
]
,
∧
B∈BAC
¬ [(c1B = 1) ∧ (c−1B = −1)] .
(3.5)
Power Status of Buses: A bus can only be powered if a neighboring generator is healthy or
a neighboring bus is powered, and the contactor connecting to that bus is closed. If no neighboring
node is healthy or powered, or the contactor is open, then the bus will be unpowered. Let B be the
set of all AC and DC buses. Consider generators G ∈ N (B) to be the neighboring generators of bus
B. For all generator-contactor pairs directly neighboring a bus, the specification can be written as
∧
B∈B


 ∨
C∈CG,G∈N (B)
((c = 1) ∧ (g = 1))
→ (b = 1)
 . (3.6)
We then examine all neighboring bus/contactor pairs connected to bus B. Let B∗ ∈ N (B) be a
neighbor bus to B, where N 1(B) ⊂ N (B), and N−1(B) ⊂ N (B). Bus B is on side 1 of components
in N 1(B), and side -1 of N−1(B). A bus may be powered if one of the following holds:
Bus B is powered if it is on side 1 of a contactor and neighboring bus pair, the contactor is closed
with power flowing in the direction of side 1 and the neighboring bus is powered. Then,
∧
B∈B


 ∨
B∗∈N 1(B)
(b∗ = 1) ∧ (c1B = 1)
→ (b = 1)
 . (3.7)
Bus B is powered if on side -1 of the contactor and bus pair, the contactor is closed with power
flowing in the direction of side -1, and the neighboring bus is powered. This is written as
∧
B∈B


 ∨
B∗∈N−1(B)
(b∗ = 1) ∧ (c−1B = −1)
→ (b = 1)
 . (3.8)
If none of the above three conditions hold, bus B will be unpowered.
Safety Criticality of Buses: Certain buses within the distribution system will be connected
to safety-critical loads, e.g., flight actuators or de-icers, and need to remain powered. Due to non-
paralleling specifications, however, these buses also need to be able to stay unpowered for short
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lengths of time in order to reconfigure contactors without violating specifications. Let Bs be the set
of all safety-critical buses. Denote the allowable length of time a bus can remain unpowered as T . For
example, typical values for T fall in the 50 msec range [62]. LTL reasons about temporal ordering,
but does not explicitly address the notion of real-time. Time in this formulation is implemented
through an additional clock variable θB associated with bus B, and where each “tick” of the clock
represents δt time. The “tick” of the clock δt represents both the time it takes for a contactor to
open or close (e.g., 10 msec), and the controller sampling time. Thus θB can takes values from
{0, δt, 2δt, . . . , Tδt}. For each safety-critical bus in B ∈ Bs, these specifications can be written as the
following.
If bus B is unpowered, then in the next step, clock variable θB will increment by 1 unit, which
is written as
 {(b = 0)→ (#θB = θB + δt)} . (3.9)
If bus B is powered, then in the next step, clock variable xB is reset to 0. This is written as
 {(b = 1)→ (#θB = 0)} . (3.10)
Clock variable xB will never be greater than the maximum allowable unpowered time Tδt . This
is implemented by

{
θB ≤ T
δt
}
. (3.11)
3.4 Capturing Actuation Delays
LTL can be used to specify “real-time” properties for synchronous systems in which all processes (i.e.,
components) proceed in a lock-step manner. The next operator has a “time” measure so that, for a
given property ϕ, #ϕ signifies at the next time instant ϕ is true. To specify a property occurring at
some point in the future, multiple next operators can be used, such that #kϕ , ## . . .# ϕ asserts
that property ϕ holds k time instants in the future. As an alternative to multiple next operators,
the “timed” specifications in the electric power system uses a clock variable to define an equivalent
property.
For simplicity, we can assume ideal contactors that can be instantaneously controlled. It is possi-
ble, however, to capture delays in contactor opening and closing times, as well as the communication
delays between the controller and the contactors. To this effect, one can introduce a controlled vari-
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able c˜ to represent the controller intent for contactor C and treat the contactor as an environment
variable. The uncertain delay between the controller intent and contactor state can be handled
by the use of an additional clock variable xC for each contactor C, where each “tick” of the clock
represents δ time. If the contactor intent is open and the contactor state is closed, the contactor
opens within [Tomin , Tomax ] units of time unless a close command is issued before it opens. If the
contactor intent is closed and the contactor state is open, the contactor closes within [Tcmin , Tcmax ]
units of time unless an open command is issued before it closes. Once the contactor intent is set,
if the contactor state does not match the intent, at the next step clock xC will increase by δ. If
contactor state and intent match, then at the next step clock xC resets to zero:
{(#c = c˜)→ (#xC = 0)}.
When the control command is the same as the contactor state, the contactor state remains the same,
i.e.,
{(c˜ = c)→ (#c = c)}.
Finally, the assumption capturing the contactor closing behavior in relation to the controller input
intent is given by
 {(c˜ = 1 ∧ c = 0 ∧ (xC < Tcmin))→ (#c = 0 ∧#xC = xC + δ)} ,
 {(c˜ = 1 ∧ c = 0 ∧ (xC ≥ Tcmin))→ (#c = 1 ∨#xC = xC + δ)} ,
(xC ≤ Tcmax).
The contactor opening behavior can be formally captured in a similar manner. The formulas men-
tioned in this remark enter to the control synthesis problem as new environment assumptions when
delays are taken into account.
3.5 Case Study
We address the problem of primary distribution in an electric power system by examining a simplified
version of the single-line diagram. Figure 3.4 shows the portion of the single-line diagram considered
for the problem formulation used in the rest of this chapter. This topology consists of high-voltage
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B3! B4!
C4! C7!
C5! C6!
B1! B2!
G1!
C1! C2!
C3!
G2! G3! G4!
Figure 3.4: Simplified diagram of the single-line diagram used in the centralized problem. Four
power sources connect to four buses through a series of seven contactors.
AC components: four generators connect to four buses via seven contactors.
3.5.1 Variables
Variables used in this formulation, and shown in Figure 3.4, are classified as environment, controlled,
or dependent.
Environment Variables: Consider G1 and G4 to be standard high-voltage AC generators,
while G2 and G3 are backup generators connected to the APU. The health statuses of the all four
sources g1, g2, g3, and g4 can each take values of healthy (1) and unhealthy (0). Again, we distin-
guish component variables and status variables by upper and lower cases, e.g., the first generator is
represented by G1, while its health status is denoted by g1.
Controlled Variables: The statuses c1, c2, c5, c6 of contactors connecting generators to buses
can each take values of open (0) or closed (1). A closed contactor will allow power to pass through,
while an open one does not. The statuses (c3, c4, c7) of contactors located between buses can take
three values. A value of 0 denotes an open contactor. A value of -1 or 1 signifies a contactor is
closed and that power is flowing from side -1 or 1, respectively.
Dependent Variables: The power statuses (b1, b2, b3, b4) of buses can be either powered (1) or
unpowered (0) depending on the status of neighboring contactors and generators.
3.5.2 Specifications
Given the topology in Figure 3.4, the specifications described in Section 3.3 reduce to the following
specifications used in the synthesis problem for the simplified single-line diagram.
Environment Assumption: The assumption that at least one power source is always healthy
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from (3.1) becomes
 {(g1 = 1) ∨ (g2 = 1) ∨ (g3 = 1) ∨ (g4 = 1)} . (3.12)
No Paralleling of AC Sources: In Figure 3.4, an instance of paralleling may occur if G1 and
G2 are both healthy, and contactors C1, C2, and C3 are all closed. Consider, for example, power
flow direction for contactor C3. In Figure 3.4, we define bus B1 as the bus on side -1 of C3, and
bus B2 on side 1 of C3. B1 corresponds to B−1C3 from notation used in Section 3.3, while B2 = B
−1
C3
.
Then, the neighbor nodes of B1 is G1, i.e., N (B1) = {G1}, and N (B2) = {G2, B3}. Equations (3.3)
and (3.4) can be reduced to the following.
If generator G1 is unhealthy and bus B1 is unpowered, then contactor C3 cannot direct power
from side -1 to side 1, i.e., it cannot take a value of 1, and the intent variable c˜3 should be assigned
accordingly. This is written as
 {¬ ((g1 = 1) ∧ (b1 = 1))→ ¬(c˜3 = 1)} . (3.13)
If generator G2 is healthy and B2 is unpowered, or if B3 and B2 are unpowered, then C3 cannot
direct power from side 1 to side -1, i.e., take a value of −1, and the intent variable c˜3 should be
assigned accordingly. This can be written as

{
(¬((g2 = 1) ∧ (b3 = 1)) ∨ (¬((b2 = 1) ∧ (b3 = 1)))→ ¬(c˜3 = −1)
}
. (3.14)
A similar argument is made for contactor statuses c4 and c7.
Given direction of flow through contactors, we can examine each bus and eliminate any configu-
ration of contactors which may allow for paralleling of sources. Consider bus B2, which we define to
be on side 1 of C3 and on side -1 of C4. Following the notation in Section 3.3, contactor C2 ∈ CB2 ,
C3 = C
1
B2
, and C4 = C−1B2 . Then, equation (3.5) reduces to the following specifications for bus B2
 {¬((c2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))} ,
 {¬((c2 = 1) ∧ (c4 = −1))} ,
 {¬((c3 = 1) ∧ (c4 = −1))} .
(3.15)
Specifications for buses B1, B3, and B4 are applied similarly.
Power Status of Buses: Consider bus B2, located on side -1 of contactor C4, and on side 1
of contactor C3. Equations (3.6) and (3.8) reduce to the following.
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For generator G2 ∈ N (B2) and C2 ∈ CG2 , if G2 is healthy and contactor C2 is closed, then B2
will be powered. This is written as
 {((g2 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1))→ (b2 = 1)} . (3.16)
For C3 = C1B2 and B1 ∈ N 1(B2), if bus B1 is powered and contactor C1 is closed with power
flowing into side 1, then B2 will be powered. This is written as
{((b1 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))→ (b2 = 1)}. (3.17)
For C4 = C−1B2 and B3 ∈ N−1(B2), if bus B3 is powered and contactor C4 is closed with power
flowing into side -1, then B2 will be powered. This is written as
{((b3 = 1) ∧ (c4 = −1))→ (b2 = 1)}. (3.18)
If none of the previous properties holds, then B2 will be unpowered, written as
{(¬((g2 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1)) ∨ ((b1 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))
∨((b3 = 1) ∧ (c4 = −1)))→ (b2 = 0)}.
(3.19)
A similar set of specifications is applied for bus statuses B1, B3, and B4.
Safety Criticality of Buses: In this problem, we consider buses B1 and B4 to be safety-critical
buses, and can be unpowered for no longer than five time steps. Each “tick" of the clock variable
θB1 and θB4 represents 10 msec. A safety specification for bus B1 is of the following form:
If B1 is unpowered, then at the next time step clock θB1 increments by one “tick" such that
{(b1 = 0)→ (#θB1 = θB1 + 1)}. (3.20)
If B1 is powered, then at the next time step reset clock θB1 to zero. This is written as
{(b1 = 1)→ (#θB1 = 0)}. (3.21)
To ensure that B1 is never unpowered for more than 5 steps (e.g., 50 msec), the specification
becomes
{θB1 ≤ 5}. (3.22)
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Unhealthy Generators: When a generator becomes unhealthy the controller will open its
nearest contactor connecting the generator to a bus. In Figure 3.4, the set of neighboring contactors
to generators are N (G1) = C1, N (G2) = C2, N (G3) = C5, and N (G4) = C6. If, for example,
generator G3 becomes unhealthy, its neighboring contactor status intent should be set to open (0).
This specification can be written as
 {(g3 = 0)→ (c˜5 = 0)} . (3.23)
3.6 Results
Consider a system model S with a set of variables V = S ∪ E. Environment variables E includes
generators G1 − G4, and system variables S consist of contactors C1 − C7 and buses B1 − B4.
Specification ϕ consists of ϕe and ϕs such that
ϕ = (ϕe =⇒ ϕs). (3.24)
Given environment assumption ϕe from Eq. (3.12), and ϕs as the conjunction of all specifications
from Eqs. (3.13)-(3.23), we synthesize a control protocol such that Eq. (3.24) holds. The output of
the synthesis procedure includes a discrete planner represented as a finite-state atuomaton. States
are pairs of system and environment states. If the system follows the transitions in the automaton,
the system will satisfy its requirements under all allowable environment actions.
3.6.1 Centralized Controller Design
We now present the results for the centralized case of the electric power system design problem with
variables and specifications discussed in the previous section. Figure 3.5 shows the simplified single-
line diagram used in problem formulation overlaid with a sample simulation run. The horizontal
axis of each graph in the figure represents the step of the simulation, starting at step 0 and ending
with step 5.
The four graphs in row 1 correspond to the statuses of the environment variables. These values
are arbitrarily input, subject to the restrictions placed on the environment. At each step, generator
statuses can switch between healthy and unhealthy as long as at least one source remains healthy.
Graphs in rows 2 and 3 correspond to the contactor statuses generated from the synthesized control
protocol. Because power can only flow from a generator, the graphs for the contactors shown in
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Figure 3.5: A simulation result for a centralized controller for the electric power system. The
horizontal axis represents the simulation step. Row 1 shows the environment inputs for generator
healths. Based on these values, the controller values for contactors are set to either open or closed,
as seen in Row 2. Additionally, Row 3 shows the direction of power flow through contactors C3, C4,
and C7. Row 4 shows the power status for all four buses.
row 2 can only take values of open or closed. Graphs in row 3, however, can take three values
corresponding to open or closed (with a direction). Graphs in row 4 correspond to the buses, and
the vertical axis represents the power status of eachbus. Because buses are dependent variables,
these values are determined by the environment variables as well as the contactor configurations.
To better understand the results shown in Figure 3.5 let us examine the simulation graphs for a
single step, namely step 2. Generator G1 is unhealthy and contactor status C1 is open. Generator G2
is healthy, and C2 is closed. Bus B2 is powered because it is connected to G2, and B1 is unpowered
because both neighboring contactors C1 and C3 are open. Meanwhile, generator G4 is healthy and
C6 is closed. Therefore, bus B4 is powered. Note, however, that C5 remains closed even though the
right auxiliary generator is unhealthy. In the previous step, G3 was healthy, and its intent to open
c˜5 in step 2 does not get implemented until step 4. In order to ensure non-paralleling of sources,
contactor C7 must remain open at step 2 because C5 is closed, even though no power is flowing from
generator G3. As a result, bus B3 is unpowered.
For safety-critical buses B1 and B4, their statuses are never unpowered for more than two time
steps throughout the entire simulation sequence. This specification is not imposed on the middle two
buses, however, and and thus B3 can remain unpowered for five steps without violating any system
requirements. In addition, at no time in the simulation run are AC sources paralleled. Consider, for
example, power flowing to bus B1. When contactor C1 is closed (steps 0, 1, and 4), C3 is always
open.
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The synthesis process produces a control protocol in the form of a finite state automaton. The
resulting automaton for the electric power system centralized controller takes roughly one minute
to solve on a MacBook Pro with a 2 GHz Intel Core Duo processor, and has 200 states. Within
each automaton state is a list of successor states, which represent possible configurations for the
system depending on the behavior of the environment states. Once the environment acts, then
the system responds and the automaton steps to its next state. From State 0, for example, the
automaton can move to State 1 if all generators and APUs become unhealthy, or move to State 2
if the right APU remains healthy but the other three power sources become unhealthy. Note that
State 1 has no successor states because its environment violates the assumption that at least one
power source remain healthy at all times. Thus as long as the environment satisfies its assumption,
then the system will satisfy its specifications. We can also synthesize a centralized case where the
total number of contactors allowed to switch at each particular time step is limited by hardware
constraints. Consider contactors C1, C2, C5, and C6 to be controlled separately because they are
connected to generators. The remaining three contactors, however, are physically controlled by a
single hardware that is only capable of switching two contactors at one time. This problem, with the
environment assumption (one source is always healthy), no longer becomes realizable as it violates
the safety requirements for buses. If the environment assumption is relaxed, i.e. at least two sources
must always remain powered, then the problem once again becomes realizable. A similar approach
holds for the case when only one of the three middle contactors can be switched at one time.
3.6.2 Distributed Control Architecture
In this section we describe the results for a distributed control structure based on the refinement tech-
nique discussed in Section 2.4. More specifically, we decompose the centralized electric power system
topology into two smaller subsystems and synthesize two local controllers. When implemented to-
gether, these controllers are guaranteed to be correct with respect to the global specification. The
physical decomposition of the electric power system is shown in Figure 3.6. Let SYS1 represent
subsystem on the left, and SYS2 the subsystem on the right. The environment and system variables
for the two subsystems are denoted by e1, s1, e2 and s2, respectively.
We now present results for two types of distributed control architectures: master/slave and
bi-directional.
Master/Slave Control Architecture: For a master/slave architecture, power flow between
the decomposed systems is controlled by one side, and unidirectional only. For the decomposition
36
B3! B4!
C4! C7!
C5! C6!
B1! B2!
GL!
C1! C2!
C3!
AL! AR! GR!
SYS1! SYS2!
Health Status !
(of SYS1 generators)!
Power!
Figure 3.6: A distributed controller decomposition for the electric power system. Components
enclosed within the dashed rectangles are controlled by their own respective controllers. The dashed
arrow represents information flow, in the form of a health status variable, directed from SYS1 to
SYS2. The solid arrow represents the physical transfer of power from SYS2 to SYS1.
shown in Figure 3.6, subsystem SYS2 is the “master” and can control the supply of power that
can flow via contactor C4. Subsystem SYS1 is the “slave” and can only receive power when SYS2
provides it. We decompose the global environment assumption, in which at least one power source
must remain healthy at each step, such that
ϕe2 = (g3 = 1 ∨ g4 = 1),
ϕe1 = (true).
The specification for ϕe1 states that there are no restrictions on the behavior of ϕe1 . The assumption
placed on ϕe2 ensures that for any execution σ ∈ Σ, the controller for SYS2 is able to supply power
to SYS1 at any step. Health status information for g1 and g2 are sent to the SYS2 via a health
status variable H1. The variable is set to 0 if neither source is healthy, and is set of 1 if either g1 or
g2 is healthy so that ϕe2 can assume knowledge about the health status of the left side.
In order for the master/slave distributed synthesis problem to become realizable, additional
assumptions and guarantees (i.e., interface refinements) need to be implemented. It is not enough
for generators G3 and G4 to be able to generate power at all steps. The controller for SYS2 must also
be able to guarantee that power can be delivered to SYS1. Thus, we introduce φ2 as a guarantee
for controller SYS2, and denote φ′2 as an assumption for controller SYS1. Because the master
subsystem controls the flow of power, a single-sided refinement is sufficient for the design problem
to be realizable, and we can set φ1 = true. The additional specification φ2 imposes conditions on
contactor status c4 and bus status b3 (the components nearest to the interface of SYS2 and SYS1).
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These specifications are of the following form: Bus B3 is never unpowered for a pre-specified period
of time T . Essentially, B3 becomes a safety-critical bus, and we introduce a variable t3 that is used
as a counter to monitor the power status
{(b3 = 0)→ (#t3 = t3 + 1)} ∧ {(b3 = 1)→ (#t3 = 0)} ∧ {t3 ≤ T}.
If health status H1 = 0, i.e., both G1 and G2 are unhealthy, then, whenever B3 is powered, C4
will close
{((H1 = 0) ∧ (B3 = 1))→ (c˜4 = −1)}.
A similar modification is made for the case when power flows from SYS1 to SYS2 (and SYS2 still
remains master). In both of the cases discussed in the master/slave architecture, all other specifi-
cations remain the same as those discussed from Section 3.3 and decomposed with their respective
components. Simulation results are comparable to those for the centralized controller, shown in
Figure 3.5, and thus omitted.
Decentralized Control Architecture: Consider again the physical decomposition shown in
Figure 3.6, where power is allowed to flow from either subsystem to the other. The physical actuation
of contactor C4 is still controlled by the right side. The environment variables for SYS1 include
G1, G2, and C4, while environment variables for SYS2 contain G3, G4, B2, and H1. Note that
this differs from the master/slave control architecture with the necessary addition of B2 as an
environment variable to allow for power to flow in two directions.
The case where there is power flow between SYS1 and SYS2 corresponds to an interconnection
where part of the output of each system acts as an environment variable for the other, i.e., both
φ1 and φ2 are non-trivial. In order to ensure that the interconnection is well-posed, i.e., the inter-
connected system avoids deadlock, environment variables should be partitioned into external and
feedback parts. For subsystem SYS1, external environment variables are g1 and g2, while the feed-
back environment is contactor C4. In order for the system to be well-posed, decisions made by the
controller for SYS1 at step t must use the value of C4 at the previous step t−1. A deadlock situation
can occur between subsystems if this time shift is not accounted for, where each subsystem waits on
an action from the other subsystem before it can make a move. See [67] for further discussion.
Due to the issue of well-posedness in the decentralized controller architecture, additional speci-
fications are introduced in order to make the problem realizable. In order to successfully synthesize
controllers for each subsystem, the following guarantees/assumptions are imposed.
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• For SYS2, if neither G3 nor G4 is healthy, then bus B2 is powered. This is written as
φr = {g3 = 1 ∨ g4 = 1 ∨ b2 = 1}.
• For SYS1, if neither G1 nor G2 is healthy, then power will be delivered through C4. This is
written as
φl = {g1 = 0 ∧ g2 = 0→ (c4 = −1)}.
Because power must be able to be delivered to both subsystems, safety-critical buses are moved to
those buses nearest the interface, i.e., to B2 and B3. In order to enforce well-posedness, specifications
for the controller for SYS1 involving C4 are defined with additional next operators to implement
a shift in time step. For the decentralized synthesis problem to be realizable, contactor delays are
thus omitted in this problem formulation in order avoid conflicting specifications.
There are advantages and disadvantages in synthesizing controllers for a centralized versus dis-
tributed architectures. A centralized controller has complete knowledge of all components’ statuses.
It can anticipate the behavior of the entire environment, and thus control protocols can be less con-
servative (e.g. longer delays in contactor closing/opening times). For large-scale systems, though, a
less-conservative controller comes at the cost of computational complexity. Distributed synthesis can
be solved using less memory (due to the smaller number of components) and are thus more scalable
to larger problems. However, due to lack of full information between subsystems, additional refine-
ments are required at the interfaces. These refinements involve a more conservative contactor and
bus configuration, (e.g, buses at the interface need to be powered more often). This is easily imple-
mentable for a master/slave architecture in which only a single-sided refinement is necessary. For the
bi-directional distributed case in which refinements ϕ1 and ϕ2 are needed, well-posedness conditions
further restrict the system. Contactor delays are no longer possible, and additional specifications
are imposed on all components along the interfaces.
3.6.3 Timing Benchmarks
In this section we consider some timing benchmarks for the electric power system. For the topology
in Figure 3.4, Table 3.2 lists the automaton size as well as total synthesis time while varying the
number of clocks, as well as the discretization of clock “ticks.” The first column indicates the
number of clocks, or counters, used in the synthesis problem. Zero clocks refers to the the untimed
synthesis problem in which all buses must always be powered. One clock refers to one essential bus
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that can never be unpowered for more than x ticks. The second column thus indicates the total
time in which the essential bus can be unpowered. The higher the number, the more clock ticks
must be incorporated into the synthesis problem. The third and fourth columns refer to the total
automaton size (i.e., number of states) generated, as well as the total computation time (in seconds),
respectively. All benchmark problems using < 2 GB memory.
Table 3.2: Synthesized Automaton Size
No. of Clocks Clock “Ticks” Aut. Size Time [sec]
0 0 16 1
1 1 32 1.5
1 3 64 1.7
1 5 96 1.7
1 10 176 2.8
1 20 336 3.1
2 1 79 2
2 3 96 2
2 5 224 2.1
2 10 384 2.5
2 20 704 2.5
3 1 478 3.5
3 3 2858 7
3 5 7180 160
3 10 45492 1084
3 20 88604 4796
4 1 1798 7.2
4 3 22008 308
4 5 93386 4778
While GR(1) fragments of LTL can be synthesized in polynomial time to the number of states,
the number of states grows exponentially with the number of clocks implemented. For small-sized
problems, the difference in synthesis time is negligible. Once, however, the number of clocks used
increases to 3, computation time jumps several orders of magnitude.
One thing to note is that the automaton size and times listed in Table 3.2 are worst-case scenarios.
Using the specifications listed in Section 3.3, automaton size and time for 2, 3, or 4 clocks are
identical to the one clock problem. This is because the first synthesis algorithm chooses the first
feasible control protocol in which all buses are either powered or unpowered simultaneously. This is
a feasible solution because in this formulation, there are no contactor delays. Thus, contactors can
be commanded to open or close immediately. In order to calculate the numbers listed in Table 3.2,
we included additional specifications requiring that the power status of buses must always eventually
differ from each other. In other words, there must be transitions between states in which not all
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buses can all be simultaneously powered or unpowered.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates how text-based specifications can be converted into a temporal logic spec-
ification language using a representative single-line diagram as an example. Given a set topology
for an electric power system, as seen in the single-line diagram from Figure 2.1 and a set of system
requirements formalized in linear temporal logic, we automatically synthesize a control protocol for
an electric power system on a more-electric aircraft. The resulting controller allows generators and
APUs to connect and disconnect to buses through the closing and opening of contactors. The health
status of each generator/APU is uncontrollable, and thus considered an environment action. The
controller reacts to changes in the environment and is guaranteed, by construction, to satisfy the
desired properties even in the presence generator failures. We synthesized a centralized controller
where statuses of all components (generators, contactors, and buses) are known. We also created dis-
tributed and decentralized controllers by refining the overall system specifications. This refinement
involves additional assumptions and guarantees between subsystem interfaces (i.e., specifications on
the components that interact with other subsystems). For a distributed controller, we implemented
a master/slave architecture where one subsystem has full authority for routing power to the other
subsystem. In the decentralized controller design, we allow power exchange between two subsystems
to flow in both directions, again refining the interface specifications.
The distributed and decentralized control protocols take less computational time to synthesize
due to fewer components within each subsystems, and thus smaller state spaces. They are, however,
more conservative than a centralized controller in terms of length of time non-essential buses are
powered. Buses closer to the interfaces between subsystems are now powered for longer lengths of
time in order to anticipate power requests from the other subsystem. From the basis of the work
in this chapter, there are a number of potential directions for both practical and theoretical future
work. We conclude the paper with a non-exhaustive list:
The number of components and specifications in the full scale electric power system represented
in the single-line diagram creates a problem that is too computationally complex for current syn-
thesis tools. There are two ways to address this challenge. The first is the method presented in this
chapter via distributed controllers. The decomposition of overall system specifications into subsys-
tem specifications, including interface assumptions and guarantees, is currently generated in an ad
hoc manner. Future work will focus on automating the process of specification decomposition. The
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second approach to addressing the full scale problem may be in the use of linear temporal logic as
a specification language. The specifications inherent in the electric power system problem concern
safety requirements only (i.e., requirements only need be written with the temporal operator “al-
ways.”) Thus, it does not utilize the full expressivity of LTL. It might be possible to solve larger
scale problems by exploiting the case that specifications only deal with safety. Timing, and network
transients, can be abstracted away to solve a series of static problems (See Section 4.4.1 for details
on solving the untimed problem).
The timing specifications, (e.g., safety and contactor open/closing times) in the electric power
system problem are addressed with the use of clocks by way of an additional counter variable.
This discretization of time further adds to the difficulties arising from state space explosion. We
are currently examining the use of timed verification and synthesis tools, in particular, UPPAAL-
TIGA [11]. The efficiency of these timed verification tools, however, is still dependent on the number
of clocks used in the model.
One open issue not addressed is what level of abstraction is needed for modeling, design, and
specifications of an electric power system. Control of the power quality from generators is considered
at a continuous level of abstraction. Load management and load shedding are considered at a discrete
low-level of abstraction. Both of these problems, although at different levels of abstraction, should
be interfaced with the primary distribution problem discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Specification and Domain-Specific
Languages
4.1 Overview
The development of a domain-specific language provides an easy interface between industry engineers
knowledgeable in aircraft systems and the methods/tools used by computer scientists and software
engineers. In this chapter we describe a domain-specific language for aircraft electric power systems
as well as an automatic specification generator available within TuLiP. The language combines tools
already in existence: visual programs for single-line diagrams, which engineers are familiar with,
and primitives, which provide a more formal structure to specifications.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 explains the input files and under-
lying graph structure used to convert a toplogy into specifications, while Section 4.3 explains how
the specifications can be represented in a domain-specific language by a set of “primitives." Section
4.4 describes the specification conversion tool AES2specgen and provides some problem complexity
benchmarks. Section 4.5 introduces an extension to the domain-specific language within an engi-
neering framework of a sequence diagram. Section 4.6 discusses how to specify requirements using
timed temporal logics.
4.2 Input Files
Figure 4.1 provides a flow diagram for the automatic specification generation procedure. Three
sets of inputs must be provided from the information given by the diagram (connectivity) and
components (attributes). First, the single-line diagram, a visual representation, can be converted
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<contactor>!
      <failure>!
         10e-3!
      </failure>!
      <opentime>!
         15!
      </opentime>!
      <closetime>!
         20!
      </closetime>!
</contactor>!
!<bus>!
      <failure>!
         10e-3!
      </failure>!
      <essential>!
         true!
      </essential>!
</bus>!
!"#$%&'("#&)
*"+$,+-)
./()01-21#&#3)
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Figure 4.1: Architecture for the specification generator. The problem description includes three
inputs: a single-line diagram, a component library, and a set of primitive specifications. The output
is a set of formal specifications compatible with Yices (a SAT solver) or TuLiP (a reactive synthesis
tool).
<contactor>!
      <failure>!
         1e-3!
      </failure>!
      <opentime>!
         15!
      </opentime>!
      <closetime>!
         20!
      </closetime>!
</contactor>!
!<bus>!
      <failure>!
         1e-3!
      </failure>!
      <essential>!
         true!
      </essential>!
</bus>!
!"#$%&'("#&)
*"+$,+-)
./()01-21#&#3)
("4,+,5)
6,"-"78&9)
:11%;)
!2&<"=<+71#)
>&#&,+31,)
?"<&9)
:@("6)
Figure 4.2: A sample XML component library file for contactor and bus components that have
attributes of opentime, closetime, and essential.
into a graph data structure, where contactors are edges, and all other components represent nodes1.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph of the electric power system, with V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} containing all
components consisting of generators, buses, and rectifier units. Loads, transformers and batteries
are not implemented in our current formulation but can be easily integrated. The set of edges
E = {e1, e2, . . . , em} then contains all contactors (as well as solid wire links between components).
The adjacency matrix Aij is a square adjacency matrix whose diagonal entries are zeros, and whose
non-diagonal entries are ones or zeros depending on whether a contactor (or solid link) exists between
vertices.
The second set of information is an XML file containing component attributes. Consider a
simple case in which the XML file contains a listing for each type of component: contactor, generator,
rectifier unit, and bus. Figure 4.2 depicts a example of an XML file for contactor and bus components.
Each component has an attribute of name and failure probability, i.e., the probability each component
has of failing over a certain number of operational hours. A failure probability of 10−3, for example,
means that the component may fail once over the course of 103 operating hours. Buses have an
1Graphical tools exist which can convert visual diagrams into XML code. We begin with the assumption that such
a conversion has been implemented and the XML file is parsed into an adjacency matrix.
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additional Boolean attribute of essential, as well as an attribute time which states how long the
bus may be unpowered for during a flight. In addition, contactors have attributes opentime and
closetime, denoting the time it takes to physically open or close the contactor.
The third input is a set of primitives used to represent the high-level requirements that specify
the desired behavior of the system. The use of primitives is described in the next section.
4.3 Specifications and Primitives
Given the topology of an electric power system and component attributes, the main design problem is
determining all correct configuration of contactors for all flight conditions and faults that may occur.
As previously discussed in Section 3.2, we again reference some common or standard specifications
relevant to the electric power system problem, and describe how these specifications may be written
using a set of primitives.
Environment Assumptions: The overall system safety level determines the possible combi-
nations of failures which may occur. Consider the case where generators and rectifier units are
environment variables, i.e., uncontrolled. Because each component has an individual failure prob-
ability, we can determine how many components may fail at a single instance (while satisfying the
system safety rating), and produce a set of valid environment assumptions. Let G and R be the
sets of all generators and rectifier units, respectively. In the environment primitive (in which only
generators and rectifier units are uncontrolled), the first input is a system safety level, followed by
all subsets of components that are uncontrolled. This can be written as env(10−x,Ge,Re), where x
is the failure rating, Ge ⊆ G and Re ⊆ R.
No-paralleling of AC sources: One common specification may be that no two asynchronous
AC sources can power a bus simultaneously. A non-paralleling primitive thus has inputs of any
subset of G. This can be written as noparallel(Gp), where Gp ⊆ G.
Essential buses: Essential buses supply power to safety-critical subsystems and loads, and thus
must be powered at all times. Let the set of all buses be B. An essential bus primitive can input
any subset of B. This is written as essbus(Be), where Be ⊆ B.
Bus unpowered time: Non-essential buses supply power to loads and subsystems which can
tolerate loss of power for up to a certain period of time. This time information is captured from
the component library, which contains the maximum unpowered time a bus may be able to tolerate.
Thus the primitive may be written buspower(Bs), where Bs ⊆ B, and Be ∩ Bs = ∅.
Disconnect with unhealthy: When certain components (generators or rectifier units) become
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unhealthy, they must be disconnected from the system for safety reasons, i.e., the contactor con-
necting that component to other buses or components, needs to open. A disconnect primitive can
take as input the union of subsets of G and R. This primitive is written as disconnect(Gd ∪ Rd),
where Gd ⊆ G and Rd ⊆ R.
4.4 Tool Integration
The electric power system can be abstracted into different model views. We consider the following
four views: untimed, discrete variables; discrete-time, discrete variables; continuous-time, discrete
variables; and continuous-time, continuous variables. A domain-specific language can facilitate con-
sistency between these views by providing a unifying framework for constituent elements. The
following section discusses how the design problem can be automatically synthesized within the
model view of discrete variables with no time or discrete-time. Our tool, which converts the above
primitives into a set of specifications, is written using Python, with the additional use of the software
package NetworkX to study the underlying graph structure. The sourcecode is included in TuLiP
version 0.4a (and above) under tools/AES directory.2
4.4.1 Untimed: SAT Solver (Yices)
Consider the case in which timing specifications are ignored. Generators and rectifier units can
either be healthy or unhealthy, contactors may either be open or closed, and buses can either be
powered or unpowered. The synthesis problem reduces to a Boolean satisfiability problem. For each
set of environment scenarios, a specific configuration of contactors satisfies all system requirements.
Our current tool converts the set of primitives to a format compatible with the solver Yices [26]3.
Based on the graph G derived from the single-line diagram, we automatically instantiate com-
ponents, such that
(define g :: bool)
(define r :: bool)
(define b :: bool)
(define c :: bool)
2Click here for AES Directory
3To be precise, Yices is an SMT solver which can also be used as a SAT solver.
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for all g ∈ G, r ∈ R, b ∈ B, and c ∈ C, where C is the set of all contactors.
Because the SAT solver searches for a different solution for each configuration of environment
behaviors, we generate all allowable environment sets, given the system safety level, and thus generate
a set of environment assertions. Let P ⊆ G × R be the set of environment variables. Environment
assumptions can be written as
(assert (= p [status]))
for all p ∈ P, and [status] is either true or false, denoting a healthy or unhealthy component.
To avoid paralleling, the tool takes all pairs of generators input from the primitive and searches
for all simple paths between items in each pair. For all simple paths between generator pairs, we
disallow all contactors within each path to be closed at the same time. Consider, for example, In
Figure 4.3, the set of contactors between g1 and g2 that constitute a live path are c1, c2, and c3. For
this case, the non-paralleling specification output would be
¬
{
3∧
i=1
ci = 1
}
,
where 1 denotes a closed contactor 4.
More generally, define Xij to be the set of all paths between two components Xi and Xj . Each
path xk ∈ X consists of some number of components such that each xk contains {x1k, . . . , xnki , for nk
components (not including Xi or Xj . To disallow non-paralleling between any two generators, the
specification is written as follows
∧
xk∈Xij
{
¬
( ∧
ck∈xk
ck = 1
)}
, ∀Xi,Xj ∈ G. (4.1)
In order to assert that a bus must always remain powered, we first output a set of specifications
which determine under what conditions a bus is powered or unpowered. We first search for all paths
between each element input into the primitive, and output all path configurations that would cause
the bus to be powered. This means all other buses, generators, and contactors in said path must be
powered, healthy, and closed (respectively). If, in none of the paths, the conditions for a powered
bus are met, then the bus is unpowered. Consider again the simple example from Figure 4.3. The
4For ease of notation, the remaining Yices specifications will be written standard propositional form, while the
actual format for the tool differs slightly.
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B1! B2!
G1!
C1! C2!
C3!
G2!
Figure 4.3: Simplified version of a the single-line diagram. Two AC generators connect to two buses
via three contactors.
two output specifications for bus b1 when it is powered would be
((g1 = 1) ∧ (c1 = 1))→ (b1 = 1),
and
((g2 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1) ∧ (b2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))→ (b1 = 1).
If neither of the two above conditions hold, then b1 is unpowered. This is written as
{¬([(g1 = 1) ∧ (c1 = 1)] ∨ [((g2 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1) ∧ (b2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))])→ (b1 = 0)}.
More generally, consider all paths Xij where Xi ∈ G and Xj ∈ B. Specifications for bus power
status can be written
∧
Xi∈G,Xj∈B
( ∧
xk∈Xij
xk = 1)→ (Xj = 1)
 , (4.2)
∨
Xi∈G,Xj∈B
¬( ∧
xk∈Xij
xk = 1)→ (Xj = 0)
 . (4.3)
Therefore, to assert that all buses are always powered, we then write
∧
b∈B
(b = 1). (4.4)
To disconnect an unhealthy generator or rectifier unit, we search the graph for adjacent nodes,
48State 0 with rank 0 -> <g0:1, g1:1, ru4:1, ru5:1, c23:0, c24:1, c67:0, b6:1, c13:1, b7:1, b2:1, b3:1, c35:1, c02:1>!
!With successors : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16!
State 1 with rank 0 -> <g0:0, g1:1, ru4:0, ru5:1, c23:0, 
c24:0, c67:1, b6:1, c13:1, b7:1, b2:0, b3:1, c35:1, c02:0>!
!With successors : 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32!
State 2 with rank 0 -> <g0:0, g1:1, ru4:1, ru5:0, c23:1, 
c24:1, c67:1, b6:1, c13:1, b7:1, b2:1, b3:1, c35:0, c02:0>!
!With successors : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16!
State 3 with rank 0 -> <g0:0, g1:1, ru4:1, ru5:1, c23:0, 
c24:0, c67:1, b6:1, c13:1, b7:1, b2:0, b3:1, c35:1, c02:0>!
!With successors : 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32!
(= b5 true)!
(= b6 true)!
(= b7 true)!
(= c56 true)!
(= c67 true)!
(= c78 true)!
(= c89 true)!
(= c1516 true)!
(= c1617 true)!
(= g2 false)!
(= c27 false)!
(= g3 true)!
(= c38 false)!
…!
(= r10 true)!
(= c510 true)!
(= r11 true)!
(= c611 true)!
!
(= c611 true)!
(= r12 true)!
(= c712 true)!
(= r13 true)!
(= c813 true)!
(= r14 true)!
(= c914 true)!
(= c56 true)!
(= c67 true)!
Figure 4.4: A sample output from Yices for a single environment configuration.
and assert an implication that if a component is unhealthy, the neighboring contactor must be open
(take a value of 0). This is written as
∧
p∈P
(p = 0)→ (∧
cp
cp = 0)
 . (4.5)
for all p ∈ P, and cp ⊆ C is the subset of contactors connecting component p to an adjacent
component.
From the above set of specifications, Yices solves a satisfiability problem and determines the
configuration for all contactors, for each environment configuration. Figure 4.4 shows an portion of
the output from Yices. Thus a controller from Yices is a set of contactor configurations for each
environment.
4.4.2 Timed: TuLiP
The benefits of an untimed model view is reducing the synthesis problem to a satisfiability problem,
in which case a SAT solver may be used, the complexity of which is less than that for synthesis
algorithms. More realistic design problems in the electric power system domain require timed speci-
fications. We therefore incorporate formats compatible with TuLiP as well as Yices in the translation
from primitives to specifications. TuLiP uses a model view that includes discrete-time and discrete
variables; specifications are written in linear temporal logic (LTL).
We visit the primitives described in Section 4.3, and begin by instantiating all variables (con-
trolled and uncontrolled). Variables are again discrete and Boolean. For all environment (uncon-
trolled) components, instantiations are written as
env_vars[p] = [0, 1], (4.6)
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for all p ∈ P. For all controlled variables, instantiations are written as
disc_sys_vars[s] = [0, 1], (4.7)
for all s ∈ B ∪ C.
To specify the allowable environment assumptions, we again take all possible allowable sets of
failures which can occur given the system failure probability. Assume the failure rate for each
component is independent. Then, all combinations of failures that have a failure probability greater
than the overall system level must be accounted for. The output specification, then, uses an always
() operator alongside a string of disjunctions.
Consider a simple example with two environment variables g1 and g2 that can take a value of 0
(unhealthy) or 1 (healthy). Suppose the overall system safety level is 10−5, and each generator has a
failure probability of 10−3. The probability that both generators are unhealthy becomes 10−6, which
is smaller than 10−5. Acceptable environment behaviors include three possibilities: g1 = 1, g2 = 1;
g1 = 1, g2 = 0; and g1 = 0, g2 = 1. Once the tool calculates this set of allowable environments, the
TuLiP compatible specification output becomes
assumptions = ((g1 = 1 ∧ g2 = 1) ∨ (g1 = 1 ∧ g2 = 0) ∨ (g1 = 0 ∧ g2 = 1)).
More formally, let I be an index set enumerating the set of environment variables. For each
environment variable pi, i ∈ I, let fi be its probability of failure in a given time interval T . Let
r be the overall reliability level the system has to achieve, that is, the probability of the overall
system failure within the interval T should be less than r. Assuming independence of component
failures, the overall reliability level of an aircraft determines the allowable environment assumptions
by providing a bound on the number of simultaneous component failures allowed. Whenever the
product of components’ probability of failure (pi) is more than the reliability level r, the control
must ensure the requirements are satisfied. Denote a single configuration of the environment (i.e.,
an environment state) by e. For a given subset I ′ ⊆ I of the environment variables, we define
eI′ = (p1, . . . , p|I|), where pi = 0 (unhealthy) if i ∈ I ′; and ei = 1 (healthy) otherwise. We can then
enumerate all allowable environment configurations based on the required reliability level, as
E =
eI′ |I ′ ⊆ I s.t. ∏
j∈I′
pj ≥ r
 . (4.8)
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With this definitions, an environment assumption can be written in LTL as
assumptions = (e ∈ E). (4.9)
The non-paralleling specification disallows all contactors to be closed if they are within a path
connecting two AC sources. In LTL, this is implemented using a never operator (¬). Using the
example, from Figure 4.3, a non-paralleling specification would be of the form
guarantees = ¬((c1 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1)).
We thus explicitly enumerate and disallow all bad configurations. Let xi,j represent the set of com-
ponents along a path between generators pi, pj , for pi, pj ∈ G and i 6= j. We disallow configurations
in which all contactors c ∈ xi,j create a live path. These specifications are written as
guarantees = 
∧
pi,pj∈G
¬ ∧
c∈xi,j
(c = 1)
 . (4.10)
The primitives for bus power and essential bus power first create a set of discrete properties that
specify the conditions for when a bus is powered. Just as in the case using Yices, we find all paths
from a bus to a generator, and list the component configurations needed for a bus to receive power.
In Figure 4.3, for example, there are two properties for which bus b1 can be powered, written as
disc_props[d1] = (g1 = 1) ∧ (c1 = 1),
disc_props[d2] = (g2 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1) ∧ (b2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1).
Then, specifications output when bus b1 is powered are
guarantees = ((d1)→ (b1 = 1)),
guarantees = ((d2)→ (b1 = 1)).
If neither proposition is true, b1 is unpowered, written as
guarantees = (¬((d1) ∨ (d1))→ (b1 = 0)).
More formally, an AC bus can only be powered if there exists a live path (i.e., all contactors closed
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along a path) that connects the bus to a healthy AC generator or a healthy APU. Similarly, a DC
bus can only be powered if there exists a live path that connects it to a healthy rectifier unit, which
itself is connected to a powered AC bus. Let xi,b denote the set of all components (i.e., contactors
and buses) along a path between bus b and environment variable pi for i ∈ I, excluding b and pi.
Furthermore, let G ⊆ P and R ⊆ P represent the sets of generators and rectifier units. AC bus b is
powered if there exists a live path between B and pi for pi ∈ G, written as
guarantees = 
 ∨
pi∈G
(pi = 1) ∧ ∧
x∈xi,B
(x = 1)
→ (b = 1)
 . (4.11)
If there exists no live path between b and a generator pi for pi ∈ G, then b will be unpowered
guarantees = 
¬ ∨
pi∈G
(pi = 1) ∧ ∧
x∈xi,B
(x = 1)
→ (b = 0)
 . (4.12)
A similar set of specifications for DC buses holds in which environment variables pi spans pi ∈ R.
Once these specifications are written, timing on buses can be introduced. If a bus is an essential
bus, then another specification guarantees that the bus always remains powered. This is written as
guarantees = (b = 1), for all b ∈ Be. For non-essential buses, we impose a maximum allowable
time for which the bus may be unpowered. This value is taken from the XML component library
file.
For each non-essential bus b ∈ Bs, we introduce a unique counter tk. We discretize each time step
to take δ time. If a bus is unpowered, at the next step the counter will increment by δ. Counters
are also bounded by a set maximum time limit. If the bus is powered, at the next step the counter
will reset to 0. These specifications are output as
guarantees = ((bk = 0)→ (#(tk) = tk + δ)), (4.13)
guarantees = ((bk = 1)→ (#(tk) = 0)), (4.14)
for all bk ∈ Bs. Then, we limit the number of “ticks” tk can increment to Tδ steps. This specification
is output as
guarantees = (tk ≤ T
δ
). (4.15)
The final set of specifications involve removing unhealthy components from the overall system.
To disconnect an unhealthy generator or rectifier unit, we use an implication. For all environment
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variables pi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , ne}, if any component becomes unhealthy then the contactor connect-
ing pi to an adjacent component must open. This is written as guarantees = ((pi = 0) →
(∧j∈Ni(cij) = 0)), where Ni denotes the set of vertices adjacent to vertex i.
The final set of specifications involve disconnecting unhealthy components from the overall sys-
tem. Let N (ei) represent the set of contactors directly connected, or neighboring, environment
variable pi for i ∈ I. We write the specifications to disconnect all unhealthy sources as
guarantees = 
∧
i∈I
(pi = 0)→ ∧
c∈N (pi)
(c = 0)
 . (4.16)
These specifications are input into TuLiP, which interfaces with a digital design synthesis tool
implemented in JTLV [74]. If the specification is realizable, TuLiP outputs a finite-state automaton
that represents the control protocol. Figure 2.3 shows a portion of a sample finite-state automaton.
Remark 3 The specifications within this section differ from the specification format used in Chap-
ter 3. While the specifications from the previous chapter are generalizable, for the purposes of a
domain-specific language we utilize the topology’s underlying graph structure (connectivity) in order
to formulate specifications using “live” paths. For problems of this scale, the computational time of
either formulation is comparable.
4.4.3 Benchmarks
In this section we discuss some results for several electric power system topologies using both Yices
and TuLiP. For ease of comparison, consider the base topology shown in Figure 4.5 that includes
both AC and DC components. Each vertical set of components (generator, DC bus, rectifier unit,
AC bus, and two contactors) form a base unit. Units may be connected together by contactors
located between AC and DC buses. We examine the results for topologies with varying numbers of
units.
Table 4.1 lists the amount of time our tool takes to convert a set of primitives for a given
base topology into formal specifications. Columns 2 and 3 show the size of the beginning graph,
while column 4 compares the difference in times between converting specifications into a Yices or
TuLiP-compatible format. The difference in conversion times is insignificant for smaller sized graphs.
The Yices conversion takes more time due to the increase of allowable environment configurations.
Because we solve a series of static problems, the tool must write a set of specifications for each of the
environment scenarios. One thing to note is that the topologies we explore have many symmetries in
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Figure 4.5: The base topology used to discuss the domain-specific language and conversion tool.
Each base unit consists of a generator, DC bus, rectifier unit, and AC bus. Units are connected to
each other by contactors between buses. More units are connected on the right (represented by the
dotted wire/line.)
the graph. Therefore, not all environment conditions need to be enumerated, e.g., an engine failure
on the left side can be treated as similar to an engine failure on the right side.
Given the set of automatically generated specifications, Table 4.2 compares the time it takes
for Yices and TuLiP to solve/synthesize a controller for a given topology. Column 2 lists the total
number of environment configurations, i.e., the number of static problems Yices must solve. Then,
Column 3 shows the time for Yices to solve a single environment configuration, as well as the time
it takes for TuLiP to solve the full synthesis problem. Columns 3 and 4 show that solving a series
of satisfiability problems is much time and memory efficient than using a synthesis tool. Increasing
the topology from four to five base units dramatically increases the computation time. In addition,
we applied the conversion tool to the single-line diagram topology from Figure 2.1. Column 5 shows
the number of states output by Yices and TuLiP. While the number of environment configurations is
large, generation of all other primitives requires only 10 seconds. For one environment configuration,
Yices takes 0.9 seconds and 39MB of memory to solve. This shows that the use of our conversion
tool can be applicable to industrial-sized problems for untimed problems.
The size of the Yices controllers is the number of different environment configurations. TuLiP
synthesized controllers with four and five base units have 256 and 1024 states, respectively. While
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Table 4.1: Specification Conversion Time for Yices (Y) and TuLiP (T) [time in seconds]
Base Units Nodes Edges Conversion Time (Y/T)
4 16 18 .13/.11
5 20 23 .25/.26
10 40 48 24/18
12 48 58 141/111
15 60 73 1634/1205
Table 4.2: Comparison of Synthesis Time for Yices (Y) and TuLiP (T). [time in seconds]
Base Units Yices Env. Time(Y/T) Mem. (Y/T) Output Size (Y/T)
4 25 .25/10.7 25MB/215MB 400/256
5 36 .82/1015 36MB/16GB 720/1022
10 121 205.7/– 53MB/– 4840/–
12 169 1410/– 158MB/– 8112/–
15 256 62208/– 1.2GB/– 15360/–
the use of a SAT solver is seemingly more advantageous than that of a synthesis tool, the range of
problems which the SAT solver can handle is limited to those with untimed specifications. Alterna-
tively, specifications written in linear temporal logic and synthesized using TuLiP can incorporate
discrete-time specifications. Thus, we can automatically generate control protocols that can not only
solve static configurations, but reason about how to transition between environment configurations
through a series of contactor switches.
4.5 Broadening the Domain-Specific Language
The primitives discussed in Section 4.3 encompass a standard set of high-level specifications found in
aircraft electric power systems. While it provides an interface to temporal logic specifications, as yet
the domain-specific language does not offer much flexibility for an engineer to design a system. While
domain-specific languages must be kept structured (i.e., limited to specific tasks), the formulation
in the above section can be extended. In the following we describe two additions to the AES2spec
tool.
4.5.1 Exceptions and Nominal Cases
Given a known set of environmental conditions or assumptions, such as those discussed in Section
3.2, all specifications must be satisfied in order for the system to function correctly. We consider
such a flight to be operating in a “nominal.” In cases, however, in which the flight were to operate
under an additional “degraded” mode, then not all specifications need be satisfied. For example, a
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nominal condition may be that half of all generators are available and healthy. A degraded condition
may be that only one generator is available to power the entire aircraft, in which case not all buses
need to satisfy the condition of always being powered. Thus, both nominal and exception cases can
be introduced into the domain-specific language.
4.5.1.1 Primitives
Assume that the XML component library contains information on what flight modes are possible,
such that set of modes M = {nom,m1, . . . ,mi}, where nom is the nominal flight mode, and i
indexes all other “degraded” modes. The following primitives can be modified such that:
No-paralleling of AC sources: For a nominal condition in which no live path can exist
between two AC sources, the primitive for non-paralleling has an input of mode m ∈ M and a
subset of generators, written as noparallel(m,Gp), where Gm ⊆ G. The LTL specification is then
translated by introducing the mode condition into the left side of the implication, such that
∧
m∈M
{
(m→ ¬(
∧
Gm
paths))
}
, (4.17)
where paths represent the conjunction of all contactors located between two elements in Gm that
could form to create a live path.
For an aircraft in nominal mode, for example, equation 4.10 becomes
 {(m = nom)→ ¬((c1 = 1) ∧ (c2 = 1) ∧ (c3 = 1))} .
Essential buses: All essential buses must always be powered in a nominal condition, but may
not necessarily be enforced if in another mode. The primitive can thus be modified with two inputs,
mode m and subset of buses Bm ⊆ B that must always remain powered: essbus(m,Bm). The LTL
specification becomes
∧
m∈M
{
((mode = m)→
∧
b∈Bm
(b = 1)))
}
. (4.18)
Bus unpowered time: The amount of time a bus remains unpowered can also depend on
the flight mode. This duration may be extended in degraded conditions. The primitive becomes
buspower(m,B′m) where B′m ⊆ B. The LTL specification can be written as
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∧
m∈M
 ∧
b∈B′m
(((mode = m) ∧ (b = 0))→ (#(tb = tb + 1)))
 , (4.19)
∧
m∈M
 ∧
b∈B′m
(((mode = m) ∧ (b = 1))→ (#(tb = 0)))
 , (4.20)
∧
m∈M
 ∧
b∈B′m
(tb ≤ Tm
δ
)
 , (4.21)
where tb is the clock variable for bus b and Tm is the maximum time which a bus can be unpowered
in flight mode m.
4.5.2 Sequence Diagrams
The second addition to the domain-specific language is the ability to integrate scenario-based re-
quirements. Sequence diagrams are a part of the SysML modeling language, and are used to define
sequences of events. Diagrams communicate messages between ”actors” and in what particular order
they must occur. Figure 4.6 depicts an example sequence diagram in which four actors interact
within some aircraft system. The pilot, supervisory control, plant, and display send messages to
each other along horizontal lines, while the vertical axis represents the progression of time. Solid
lines represent messages that must occur, while dotted lines represent messages that may occur. The
length of the vertical green boxes signifies time, but is not meant to represent an exact duration.
4.5.2.1 Live Sequence Charts
Sequence diagrams lack semantics, which makes integration with formal methods tools difficult.
Kugler and Harel [49] have provided semantics for a variant of sequence diagrams, called Live
Sequence Charts. With these imposed semantics, the behaviors of live sequence charts can be
captured using temporal logic. In particular, two types of charts can be used: existential (sequence of
events must happen at least once) and universal (sequence of events must always happen). Existential
charts can be expressed in CTL, while universal charts are expressible in LTL. The live sequence
chart to temporal logic conversion can be shown to generate a formula that is at most quadratic in
the size of the chart.
A further extension of live sequence charts is shown in [56] that incorporates assume-guarantee
scenarios. Furthermore, this extension of sequence charts extends syntax and semantics to distin-
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Figure 4.6: An example sequence diagram with pilot, control, plant, and display actors. Actors send
messages (horizontally) along vertical lines (representing the dimension of time).
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guish between system and environment entities, and supports conversion to GR(1) fragments of
LTL. In this next sections we follow the exposition of [50] and [56] in describing the live sequence
chart to temporal logic conversion.
4.5.2.2 Live Sequence Chart Semantics
Consider the set of live sequence charts depicted in Figure 4.7. Vertical lines (in which time progresses
downward) are instances that represent an interacting agent. Agents are controlled either by the
system or environment. Messages are horizontal lines that represent calls between agents. A message
is a system message if it is sent from an instance controlled by the system, and is an environment
message if sent from an environment instance. The chart defines a partial order on messages induced
by the vertical ordering of messages sent and received along instances.
In the top left chart of Figure 4.7 (InsertCoins), user is an environment instance, while panel
and cashier are system instances. Messages insertCoin and incCoins are environment and
system messages, respectively.
A system cut represents the current state of an live sequence chart, signifying the progress of
events along instances. The minimal cut is the state at which the chart is closed. A message is
enabled in a cut of the chart if it appears immediately after the cut in the induced partial order. A
message is violating in a cut if it appears in the chart but is not enabled.
Messages, depicted as either red or blue lines, can be hot or cold. A hot enabled message must
eventually occur. A cold enabled message could eventually occur. A cut may be hot if at least one of
the enabled system messages is hot, otherwise it is cold. The chart progresses to the next cut when
an enabled message occurs. If a violating message occurs, transitions depend on the temperature of
the cut. If the cut is cold, the chart closes gracefully. If a cut is hot, then this represents a violation
of requirements.
Conditions may also be hot or cold, and are evaluated as soon as they are enabled. A hot enabled
condition must be evaluated to be true, while a cold enabled condition may or may not be evaluated
to true. The chart progresses to the next cut if a condition is evaluated to be true. If a condition
is evaluated false and the condition is cold, the chart closes gracefully If the condition is hot, this
represents a violation of requirements.
System messages can be either execution or monitoring (solid and dashed lines, respectively).
All environment messages are monitoring. A chart is active if the current cut has an enabled system
message.
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Figure 4.7: Three assume-guarantee scenarios for an example vending machine specification. System
entities include panel, cashier, and dispenser. Environment entities include user and heater. Figure
from [56].
4.5.3 LTL-Live Sequence Chart Semantics
Given a set of live sequence charts L = {L1, . . . ,Ln}, let Ms(L) andMe(L) be defined as the set
of system and environment messages that can be sent, respectively. Additionally, let the two sets be
disjoint, such thatMs(L) ∩Me(L) = 0. the following variables are used to define a formal model:
• me is an environment message variable (input) over the domain of all messages the environment
can send in L. An additional no_op value is included for doing nothing. For every environment
message m ∈Me(L) ∪ {no_op} sent, a synthesized strategy will know how to react.
• ms is a system message variable (output) over the domain of all messages the system can send
in L. An additional no_op is included for doing nothing. For every state, the synthesized
strategy knows which system message m ∈Ms(L) ∪ {“no_op”} to send.
• {l1, . . . , ln} is the set of output cut variables. Every li encodes a cut automaton for live
sequence chart Li. The domain of li, denoted dom(li) consists of all possible Li cuts, including
the minimal cut (denoted by MIN). Two additional sink values of VIOs and VIOe represent
hot violation of system guarantees and environment assumptions.
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The minimal cut value MIN indicates a closed chart. VIOs indicates that the system performed a
hot violation. Thus, the chart can not be satisfied. VIOe indicates that the environment violated its
assumptions, and thus the chart is vacantly satisfied. Denote ρLi the transition of the cut automaton
Li. The following are the assumptions and guarantees, in GR(1) form, for the live sequence chart.
4.5.3.1 Superstep Requirements
In order to encode assumptions in live sequence chart semantics, we include superstep requirements.
A superstep is a series of system messages encapsulated between environment messages. This enforces
an artificial technical step to deal with the mechanics of a game structure, and thus ties in to the
GR(1) synthesis algorithm.
Guarantee 1: The system will only sends a finite number of messages, allowing the environment
a fair chance to communicate.
3(ms = no_op). (4.22)
Guarantee 2: The system performs a message only if the environment is not sending a message.
Thus, if the environment send a message, the system cannot send a message.
# (me 6= no_op→ ms = no_op). (4.23)
Assumption 1: The environment can only send one message at a time, giving the system a fair
chance to react. If the environment cannot sent a message in the next step if it has sent a message
in the last step.
 (me 6= no_op→ #(me = no_op)) . (4.24)
Assumption 2: If the system sent a message in the last step, the environment cannot send
a message in the next step. This guarantees that the environment will not send a message if the
system is not ready to receive one.
 (ms 6= no_op→ #(me = no_op)) . (4.25)
The semantics for superstep requirements are not application-specific, but rather model the live
sequence chart settings. In the following, we describe the GR(1) formulation for application-specific
live sequence chart specifications.
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4.5.3.2 Environment Assumptions
Define Expi ⊆ dom(li) to be the subset of cuts that contain executable environment messages.
Given a cut c ∈ dom(li), furthermore define ξe(c) to be the set of hot environment messages enabled
in cut c. If c ∈ dom(li)\Expi, then ξe(c) = 0.
Assumption 3: For every live sequence chart Li ∈ L and expecting cut c ∈ Expi, if in the
last step the system was in cut c then the environment in the next step will send either no_op or a
message from the set of hot enabled messages:
n∧
i=1
∧
c∈Expi
(li = c→ #(me ∈ {ξe(c) ∪ no_op})). (4.26)
Assumption 4: If the system is in an expecting cup, each enabled hot environment message
m ∈ ξe(c) must eventually be sent:
n∧
i=1
∧
c∈Expi
∧
m∈ξe(c)
3(li = c→ (me = m)). (4.27)
Assumption 5: The environment must avoid letting the system reach the sink value that
indicates a hot environment violation:
n∧
i=1
(li 6= VIOe). (4.28)
4.5.3.3 System Guarantees
For a set of live sequence charts {L1, . . . ,Ln}, we define Acti ⊆ dom(li) to be the cuts that contain
an executable message the system should perform.
Guarantee 3: For every live sequence chart Li ∈ L, the system starts from a state in which cut
variable li is the minimal cut.
n∧
i=1
(li = MIN). (4.29)
Guarantee 4: For every Li ∈ L, the system continuously preserves the transitions of the cut
automaton of Li.
n∧
i=1
ρLi . (4.30)
Guarantee 5: The system will always eventually reach a state in which Li ∈ L is not active,
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Figure 4.8: An example assume-guarantee live sequence chart with one system instance (control)
and two environment instances (pilot and generator). Blue lines denote cold messages (eventually
can happen), while red lines denote hot messages (must happen).
i.e., all charts visit inactive cuts in which there are no executable system messages.
3 n∧
i=1
(li /∈ Acti). (4.31)
4.5.4 Live Sequence Chart Example
Figure 4.8 is a generic example assume-guarantee live sequence chart for the system topology depicted
from Figure 4.5 (with 2 base topology units). If a generator becomes unhealthy (cold message), then
the control must open the contactor. Then, the pilot may send a request (to turn the generator
back online), the generator can turn back to healthy, and then send a reset message to the control.
If the reset message is sent to the control, the contactor must close.
In addition to the specifications discussed in the previous section, the following assumptions are
included in the synthesis formulation, as derived from the live sequence chart.
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• The pilot environment request variable is set to an initial value of 0 (i.e., no request).
∧
i∈{0,1}
reqi = 0,
where index i represents the generator which the pilot requests to come back online.
• Generators cannot come back online unless they are requested. This is formulated as
∧
i∈{0,1}
{((reqi = 0) ∧ (gi = 0))→ (#gi = 0)}.
The following are the additional guarantees generated from the live sequence chart.
• The controller reset variable is initially set to 0 (i.e., there is initially no reset flag raised).
∧
i∈{0,1}
reseti = 0.
• The reset flag is only raised if the pilot requests the generator to come back online.
∧
i∈{0,1}
{(reqi = 0)→ (reseti = 0)},
∧
i∈{0,1}
{(reqi = 1)→ (reseti = 1)}.
• If a generator is healthy (i.e., online) and the reset flag is raised, then the neighboring contactor
must close. ∧
i∈{0,1}
{((gi = 1) ∧ (reseti = 1))→ (cij = 1)},
where index j references a neighboring node to generator gi.
Additional timing specifications can be incorporated into the above specifications by introducing
counter variables. For instance, the reset flag may not necessarily be raised immediately once the
pilot sets the request, but may occur after a given time delay. Likewise, contactor delays may be
included (as discussed in Section 3.4).
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Figure 4.9: Unit test for a sample portion of an electric power system. The plant contains one
generator, contactor, and bus. The cockpit (pilot) can send a switch to command the contactor
position. Protection and supervisor controllers monitor the state of the system.
4.6 Timed Temporal Logics
In what follows we start with a set of text-based specifications and consider different ways of formal-
izing them. Depending on the model of computation one wants to reason about the specification, we
adopt different state-based and event-based semantics. In particular, we use MTL with continuous
semantics [46] and TCTL [6], in addition to GR(1) LTL formulations.
Consider the unit test configuration in Figure 4.9. The plant consists of a generator, contactor,
and bus (subject to load disturbance). For the purposes of specification, we choose a level of
abstraction high enough to ignore continuous dynamics. The generator outputs some voltage that is
monitored by the Protection Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The protector outputs a fault warning to
the supervisor LRU if the generator voltage exceeds some threshold. The supervisor also monitors
the switch command from the Cockpit (controlled by the pilot). Based on the states of fault and
switch, the supervisor controls the state of the contactor.
The text-based specifications for the supervisor and protector are listed below.
Protector
1. If input is greater than threshold for z1 time, fault output is true.
2. If input is less than threshold for z2 time, fault output is false.
These specifications do not cover “if and only if”s. More precisely, it is likely possible for a
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fault output when there is no fault. For instance, for state-based semantics this would lead to “
if the current state is fault = false, then the state becomes fault = true if and only if input is
greater than threshold for z1 time." As a simplification, we can assume lazy controllers, i.e., if the
preconditions do not hold, the controller should not take any action.
Supervisor
3. If fault occurs, open contactor within X time regardless of other inputs and leave open (no
reset).
4. If switch is on, close contactor within Y1 time.
5. If switch is off, open contactor within Y2 time.
These specifications are ambiguous in that it is not clear whether “open/close contactor” refers
to the event of supervisor issuing an “open (close)” command or the event that the actual
state of the contactor component becoming “open (close)”. For the latter case, in order to
synthesize a controller for these specifications, we need to know the relation between issuing a
command and physical state change in the contactor. This can ideally be done by building a
hybrid dynamical model for the contactor. For simplicity, in control synthesis, we will use the
following assumptions:
6. If an open command is issued and if the contactor state is closed, the contactor opens within
[Omin, Omax] units of time unless a close command is issued before it opens.
7. If a close command is issued and if the contactor state is open, the contactor closes within
[Cmin, Cmax] units of time unless an open command is issued before it closes.
4.6.1 Timed Specifications
4.6.1.1 Protector
For the protector LRU, the voltage level v is an environment variable, and can take values of bt
(below threshold) and at (above threshold). The system outputs a fault state variable fault of f
(there exists a fault) or nf (no fault). In MTL, specifications (1) - (2) can be written as:
1. {([0,z1)v = at) −→ (3{z1}fault = f)}.
2. {([0,z2)v = bt) −→ (3{z2}fault = nf)}.
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In TCTL, we introduce an additional clock variable c on the voltage environment variable.
Specifications (1) - (2) can be written in the form
1. ∀{((v = at)and(c ≥ z1)) −→ (fault = f)}
2. ∀{((v = bt)and(c ≥ z2)) −→ (fault = nf)}
3. ∀{((fault = f)and(c = 0)) −→ ∀[(fault = f)W ((v = at)and(c ≥ z1))]}
4. ∀{((fault = nfand(c = 0)) −→ ∀[(fault = nf)W ((v = bt)and(c ≥ z2))]}
where ∀ indicates for all paths, and W is the operator for weak until (i.e., the condition before W
does not have to be true).
4.6.1.2 Supervisor
For the Supervisor LRU, environment variables include the fault variable (considered a system
variable from the protector), switch, which can either be on or off , and contactor state cs that can
either be opened or closed. System variables include a contactor command cc of open or close, and
an additional flag that can either be normal or abnormal. Specifications (3)-(7) are written as
1. (a) {(fault = f) −→ ((3Xcs = open)and(flag = abnormal))}
(b) {((flag = abnormal)and(cs = open)) −→ (cs = open)}
(c) {(flag = abnormal) −→ (flag = abnormal)}
(d) {(flag = normal) U (fault = f)}
2.  {((flag = normal)and(switch = on)) −→ (3Y1cs = closed)}
3.  {((flag = normal)and(switch = off)) −→ (3Y2cs = open)}
4. {(cc = open)and(cs = closed)) −→
{(3[Omin,Omax](cs = open) ∨ ((cs = closed) U [0,Omax](cc = closed))}}
5. {(cc = close)and(cs = open)) −→
{(3[Cmin,Cmax](cs = closed) ∨ ((cs = open) U [0,Cmax](cc = open))}}
The TCTL version of specifications follow exactly from the above, with the replace of  with a
∀ operator.
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(a) Voltage
(b) Fault
Figure 4.10: UPPAAL-TIGA finite-state automata for the protector LRU.
4.6.1.3 UPPAAL-TIGA
Figure 4.10 depicts the protector finite-state automata used for the timed synthesis tool UPPAAL-
TIGA, which includes two processes: Voltage, and Fault. The Voltage process alternates between
below threshold and above threshold. A local clock c counts the time the system is in each state.
Dotted lines represent environment (uncontrollable) transitions, while solid lines represent control-
lable transitions. In addition, the message a is sent (denoted by the ! sign) from voltage, and received
by the Fault process (denoted by the ? sign). In the Fault process, two pseudo-states are introduced
in addition to the f and nf states. This is done because of the limitations in UPPAAL-TIGA
specifications. The tool can synthesize controllers for only one specification, but not multiple ones.
This could be solved with the conjunction of all specifications previously listed. However, UPPAAL-
TIGA cannot process nested specifications, which occur because of the weak until operatorsW . The
Fault process, therefore, encodes those specifications by design.
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Figure 4.11 depicts the supervisor finite-state automata used in the timed synthesis problem. The
three processes are fault, switch, and contactor. The fault can transition (uncontrolled) from normal
to abnormal at any time. The pilot can also change the switch between on and off at any time. The
contactor encodes from contactor command and contactor state. Again, the same problems arise in
the supervisor LRU as in the protector LRU, namely, specifications cannot be nested.
While UPPAAL and UPPAAL-TIGA can be used to verify and synthesize timed problems,
respectively, they are more useful for systems with simple specifications. For more complex spec-
ifications, even with simple unit tests used in our examples, this tool can be limited. While these
requirements can be designed by hand, this bypasses the utility gained from synthesizing correct-
by-construction controllers. We next discuss how to implement continuous time specifications in a
discrete-time setting.
4.6.2 Discrete-Time LTL
Because of the limitations of timed synthesis tools, we additionally formulate the specifications
for supervisor an protector in GR(1) LTL compatible with TuLiP, and synthesize controllers. To
monitor time in the discrete setting, we introduce an additional clock variable xv for the protector,
and xC for the supervisor.
4.6.2.1 Protector
In LTL, the specifications for the protector can be written as
1. Reset the clock to zero if the voltage state changes.
{(#v 6= v)→ (#xv = 0)}
2. If the voltage remains above threshold but the clock is less than the maximum time, then
increment the clock by some amount δ.
{(v = at ∧#v = at ∧ (xv < z1))→ (#xv = xv + δ)}
3. If the voltage remains above threshold and the clock is already at the maximum time, then
keep the clock value the same. In other words, this sets a maximum bound on the clock value.
{(v = at ∧#v = at ∧ (xv = z1))→ (#xv = z1)}
4. If the voltage remains below threshold but the clock is less than the maximum time, then
increment the clock by some amount δ.
{(v = bt ∧#v = bt ∧ (xv < z2))→ (#xv = xv + δ)}
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(a) Fault
(b) Switch
(c) Contactor
Figure 4.11: UPPAAL-TIGA finite-state automata for the supervisor LRU
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Figure 4.12: UPPAAL-TIGA finite-state automata for the supervisor LRU
5. If the voltage remains above threshold and the clock is already at the maximum time, then
keep the clock value the same.
{(v = bt ∧#v = bt ∧ (xv = z2))→ (#xv = z2)}.
6. If the voltage is above threshold for greater than z1 length of time, then output a fault.
{(v = at ∧ xv = z1)→ (fault = f)}.
7. If the voltage is below threshold for greater than z2 length of time, then output no fault.
{(v = bt ∧ xv = z2)→ (fault = nf)}.
8. The fault status cannot change until the voltage stays above threshold for at least z2 time.
{((v = at) ∧ (#xv < z2))→ (#fault = fault)}
9. The fault status cannot change until the voltage stays below threshold for z1 time.
{((v = bt) ∧ (#xv < z1))→ (#fault = fault)}
For time constants z1, z2 = 3, and a discrete time step δ = 1, the synthesized controllers for
the protector has 14 states. Figure 4.12 shows the resulting controller. The initial state (State 0)
begins with a voltage below threshold, no fault, and counter x set to 0. If the voltage stays below
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threshold, the system transitions to State 1, and the counter increments by 1. If the voltage goes
above threshold, the system transitions to State 2. If the voltage stays above the threshold for
longer than two steps, fault outputs a value of f (State 5). From State 5, if the voltage crosses
below threshold again, the fault output remains f until the voltage remains below threshold for 3
steps.
4.6.2.2 Supervior
In LTL, the specifications for the supervisor can be written as
Assumptions
1. If the contactor state is the same as the contactor command, then in the next step the contactor
state should not change.
{(cc = cs)→ (#cs = cs)}
2. If the contactor command is set to close, then the contactor state should closed within Cmin
and Cmax time.
(a) {(cc = close ∧ cs = opened ∧ (xC < Cmin))→ (#cs = opened ∧#xC = xC + δ)}.
(b) {(cc = close ∧ cs = opened ∧ (xC ≥ Cmin))→ (#cs = closed ∨#xC = xC + δ)}.
(c) {(cc = close ∧ cs = opened)→ (xC ≤ Cmax)}.
3. If the contactor command is set to open, then the contactor state should be opened within
Omin and Omax time.
(a) {(cc = open ∧ cs = closed ∧ (xC < Omin))→ (#cs = closed ∧#xC = xC + δ)}.
(b) {(cc = open ∧ cs = closed ∧ (xC ≥ Omin))→ (#cs = opened ∨#xC = xC + δ)}.
(c) {(cc = open ∧ cs = closed)→ (xC ≤ Omax)}.
Guarantees
1. (a) Reset the clock if in the next step the contactor state matches the command.
{(#cs = cc)→ (#xc = 0)}
(b) If there is a fault, then open the contactor.
{(fault = f) −→ ((cc = 0) ∧ (flag = abnormal))}
(c) If a fault occurs, always leave the contactor open.
{((flag = abnormal) ∧ (cc = 0)) −→ (#cc = 0)}
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(d) {(flag = abnormal) −→ (#flag = abnormal)}
(e) Do not raise a flag unnecessarily.
{((flag = normal) ∧ (#fault = nf)) −→ (#flag = normal)}
2. If the switch command is set to on, then close the contactor.
 {((flag = normal) ∧ (switch = on)) −→ (cc = close)}
3. If the switch command is set to off , then open the contactor.
 {((flag = normal) ∧ (switch = off)) −→ (cc = open)}
For minimum and maximum opening and closing time constraints ofOmin, Cmin = 2, Omax, Cmax =
4, and for a time step of δ = 1, the resulting synthesized controller has 32 states. The size of the
finite-state automaton will increase with the the size of the discretization δ as well as the values of
Cmax and Omax.
4.7 Conclusions
We have demonstrated techniques for synthesis of discrete-variable, untimed and discrete-time con-
trol protocols. Further extensions also include extending the domain-specific language to include
user-specific requirements that may not be included in the high-level general specifications described
in this chapter. Generation specification from assume-guarantee live sequence charts are performed
manually. While tools exist to synthesize controllers from a given live sequence chart [57], this does
not allow integration of live sequence chart specification with other system requirements. Integra-
tion of live sequence chart specifications with TuLiP is subject of future work. In addition, we are
also exploring the use of this tool and language to distributed controller protocols. Namely, how
to distribute a given topology among subsystems and generate interface specifications such that
the overall system is realizable. Lastly, the problem of network effects, including transients and
delays, has been mostly ignored or abstracted away within this problem formulation. Introducing
specifications encompassing network effects would be an additional feature for a domain-specific
language.
This chapter has also demonstrated how to formulate timed specifications within the framework
of MTL and TCTL. The TCTL synthesis solver UPPAAL-TIGA is limited in the specifications it is
capable of handling, while no tool for MTL synthesis (or even model checking) is currently available.
This led to a formulation of specifications in LTL, in particular, within the fragment of GR(1) by
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the use of additional of counters. The main challenge that synthesis may be able to solve is the
interaction of timing delays within the larger system. Such problems are the subject of future work.
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Chapter 5
Design Space Exploration
This chapter addresses the concept of design space exploration for an aircraft electric power system.
To achieve an optimal implementation that is correct by construction, we propose a methodology for
electric power system design that enables independent implementability of system topology (i.e. in-
terconnection among elements) and control protocols by using a compositional approach. In this
flow, design space exploration is carried out as a sequence of refinement steps from the initial speci-
fication towards a final implementation by mapping higher-level behavioral and performance models
into a set of library components at the lower level. To perform such tasks, we define convenient
abstractions for system exploration and compositional synthesis of system topology (interconnection
among the various components) and control. We first synthesize an electric power system topology
from system requirements formalized as arithmetic constraints on Boolean variables. For the given
topology, we translate the same requirements into linear temporal logic formulas (as discussed in
Chapter 3), by which we create correct-by-construction controllers. To reason about different re-
quirements in a compositional way, we use the concept of contracts [81] that formalize the notion of
interfaces between models and tools in the design flow.
Section 5.0.1 provides background on contract-based design, including the notion of contracts
and components, as well as Signal Temporal Logic (STL), a specification language We show the
effectiveness of our approach on a proof-of-concept design based on an electric power system case
study. Section 5.1 applies the design space exploration methodology on a case study. The work
presented in this section is in collaboration with Pierluigi Nuzzo, Necmiye Ozay, and Alexander
Donze. Finally, in Section 5.2, we present a hardware testbed for the electric power system in which
to validate synthesized reactive controllers within a real-time setting.
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5.0.1 Background: Contract-Based Design of Cyberphysical Systems
Inspired by recent results on assume-guarantee compositional reasoning and interface theories in
the context of hybrid systems and software verification, our methodology is based on the use of
assume-guarantee contracts for cyber-physical systems [12, 81]. Informally, contracts mimic the
thought process of a designer, who aims at guaranteeing certain performance figures for the design
under specific assumptions on its environment. The essence of contracts is, therefore, a compositional
approach, where design and verification complexity is reduced by decomposing system-level tasks into
more manageable subproblems at the component level, under a set of assumptions. System properties
can then be inferred or proved based on component properties. In this respect, contract-based
design can be a rigorous and effective paradigm while dealing with the complexity of modern system
design, and has been successfully applied to other embedded system domains, such as automotive
applications [12] and mixed-signal integrated circuits [66].
5.0.1.1 Components
We summarize the main concepts behind contract-based design starting with the notion of compo-
nents. A component M can be seen as an abstraction, a hierarchical entity representing an element
of a design, characterized by the following component attributes:
• a set of input, output and internal variables (including state variables); a set of configuration
parameters, and a set of input, output and bidirectional ports for connections with other
components;
• a set of behaviors, which can be implicitly represented by a dynamic behavioral model F(·) = 0,
uniquely determining the value of the output and internal variables given the one of the input
variables and configuration parameters. Behaviors are generic, and could be continuous func-
tions that result from solving differential equations, or sequences of values or events recognized
by an automata model;
• a set of non-functional models, i.e. maps that allow computing non-functional attributes of
a component corresponding to particular valuations of its input variables and configuration
parameters. Examples of non-functional maps include the performance model, computing a
set of performance figures by solving the behavioral model, or the reliability model, providing
the failure probability of a component.
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Components can be connected together by sharing certain ports under constraints on the values
of certain variables. In what follows, we use variables to denote both component variables and
ports. Moreover, components can be hierarchically organized to represent the system at different
levels of abstraction. Given a set of components at level l, a system can then be composed by
parallel composition and represented as a new component at level l+1. At each level of abstraction,
components are also capable of exposing multiple, complementary views, associated to different
concerns (e.g. safety, performance, reliability), which can be expressed via different formalisms and
analyzed by different tools.
A component may be associated to both implementations and contracts. An implementation M
is an instantiation of a componentM for a given set of configuration parameters. The definition of
contract is presented below.
5.0.1.2 Contracts
A contract C for a component M is a pair of assertions (A,G), called the assumptions and the
guarantees. An assertion B represents a specific set of behaviors over variables, which is the set
satisfying B. Therefore, operations on assertions and contracts are set operations. An implementa-
tion M satisfies an assertion B whenever M and B are defined over the same set of variables and
all the behaviors of M satisfy the assertion, i.e. when M ⊆ B. The set of all the legal environments
for C collects all implementations E such that E ⊆ A. An implementation of a component satisfies
a contract whenever it satisfies its guarantee, subject to the assumption. Formally, M ∩ A ⊆ G,
where M and C have the same variables. We denote such a satisfaction relation by writing M |= C.
Similarly, we relate a legal environment E to a contract C by the satisfaction relation E |=E C.
Any implementationM of a component such thatM ⊆ G∪¬A, where ¬A is the complement of A,
is also an implementation for C. In general,MC = G∪¬A is the maximal implementation for C. Two
contracts C and C′ with identical variables, identical assumptions, and such that G′ ∪¬A = G∪¬A,
possess identical sets of implementations. Such two contracts are then equivalent. Therefore, any
contract C = (A,G) is equivalent to a contract in saturated form (A,G′), which also satisfiesG′ ⊇ ¬A,
or, equivalently, G′ ∪A = True, the true assertion. To obtain the saturated form of a contract, it is
enough to take G′ = G ∪ ¬A.
Contracts associated to different components can be combined according to different rules. Simi-
lar to parallel composition of components, parallel composition of contracts can be used to construct
composite contracts out of simpler ones. Let C1 = (A1, G1) and C2 = (A2, G2) in saturated form,
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then the assumption and the promise of the composite C1 ⊗ C2 can be computed as follows [12]:
A = (A1 ∩A2) ∪ ¬(G1 ∩G2), (5.1)
G = G1 ∩G2. (5.2)
The composite contract must clearly satisfy the guarantees of both. Moreover, since the environment
should satisfy all the assumptions, we should expect that the assumptions of each contract would also
combine by conjunction. In general, however, part of the assumptions A1 will be already satisfied
by composing C1 with C2, which acts as a partial environment for C1. Therefore, G2 can relax the
assumptions A1, and vice-versa, which motivates (5.1). To use (5.1) and (5.2), the behaviors related
to the original contracts need to be extended to a common set of variables. Such an extension, which
is also called alphabet equalization, can be achieved by an operation of inverse projection [12].
Even if they need to be satisfied simultaneously, multiple views of the same component do not
generally compose by parallel composition. Therefore, the conjunction (∧) of contracts can also be
defined so that if M |= C1 ∧ C2, then M |= C1 and M |= C2. Contract conjunction can be computed
by defining a partial order on contracts, which formalizes a notion of refinement. We say that C
refines C′, written C  C′ (with C and C′ both in saturated form), if and only if A ⊇ A′ and G ⊆ G′.
Refinement amounts to relaxing assumptions and reinforcing guarantees, therefore strengthening the
contract. Clearly, ifM |= C and C  C′, thenM |= C′. On the other hand, if E |=E C′, then E |=E C.
With the given ordering, we can compute the conjunction of contracts by taking the greatest lower
bound of C1 and C2. For contracts in saturated form, we have
C1 ∧ C2 = (A1 ∪A2, G1 ∩G2), (5.3)
i.e. conjunction of contracts amounts to taking the intersection of the guarantees and the union of
the assumptions. Conjunction can be used to compute the overall contract for a component starting
from the contracts related to multiple views (concerns, requirements) in a design.
In addition to satisfaction and refinement, consistency and compatibility are also relations involv-
ing contracts. Technically, these two notions refer to individual contracts. A contract is consistent
when the set of implementations satisfying it is not empty, i.e. it is feasible to develop implemen-
tations for it. For contracts in saturated form, this amounts to verify that G 6= ∅. Let M be any
implementation, i.e. M |= C, then C is compatible, if there exists a legal environment E for C, i.e. if
and only if A 6= ∅. The intent is that a component satisfying contract C can only be used in the
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context of a compatible environment. In practice, however, violations of consistency and compati-
bility occur as a result of a parallel composition, so that we can refer to the collection of components
forming a composite contract as being consistent or compatible.
5.0.1.3 Signal Temporal Logic
In addition to LTL, Signal Temporal Logic (STL) is likewise a particularly suitable for capturing
system and component requirements and reasoning about the correctness of their behaviors.
LTL allows formally reasoning about the temporal behaviors of reactive systems with Boolean,
discrete-time signals or sequences of events. To deal with dense-time real signals and hybrid dy-
namical model that mix the discrete dynamics of the controller with the continuous dynamics of
the plant, several logics have been introduced over the years, such as Timed Propositional Tempo-
ral Logic [3], and Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [46]. Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [55] has been
proposed more recently as a specification language for constraints on real-valued signals in the con-
text of analog and mixed-signal circuits. In this chapter, we refine LTL system requirements into
constraints on physical variables (e.g. voltages and currents) expressed using STL constructs. Then,
we monitor and process simulation traces to verify constraints satisfaction, while optimizing a set of
design parameters.
For a hybrid dynamical model, we define a signal as a function mapping the time domain T = R≥0
to the reals R. A multi-dimensional signal x is then a function from T to Rn such that ∀t ∈ T,
x(t) = (x1(t), · · · , xn(t)), where xi(t) is the i-th component of vector x(t). Moreover, we assume
that a hybrid system behavioral model F (e.g. implemented in a simulator) takes as input a signal
u(t) and computes an output signal y(t) = F(u(t)). The collection of output signals resulting from
a simulation of the system is a trace, which can also be viewed as a multi-dimensional signal.
In STL, constraints on real-valued signals, or predicates, can be reduced to the form µ = f(x) ∼ pi,
where f is a scalar-valued function over the signal x, ∼∈ {<,≤,≥, >,=, 6=}, and pi is a real number.
As in LTL, temporal formulas are formed using temporal operators, always, eventually and until.
However, each temporal operator is indexed by intervals of the form (a, b), (a, b], [a, b), [a, b], (a,∞)
or [a,∞), where each of a, b is a non-negative real-valued constant. If I is an interval, then an STL
formula is written using the following grammar:
ϕ := True | µ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 UI ϕ2
The always and eventually operators are defined as special cases of the until operator as follows:
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Iϕ , ¬3I¬ϕ, 3Iϕ , TrueUI ϕ. When the interval I is omitted, we use the default interval of
[0,+∞).
The semantics of STL formulas are defined informally as follows. The signal x satisfies µ =
f(x) < 2 at time t (where t ≥ 0), written (x, t) |= µ, if f(x(t)) < 2. It satisfies ϕ = [0,2) (x > −1),
written (x, t) |= ϕ, if for all time 0 ≤ t < 2, x(t) > −1. The signal x1 satisfies ϕ = 3[1,2) x1 > 0.4
iff there exists time t such that 1 ≤ t < 2 and x1(t) > 0.4. The two-dimensional signal x = (x1, x2)
satisfies the formula ϕ = (x1 > 10) U[2.3,4.5] (x2 < 1) iff there is some time u where 2.3 ≤ u ≤ 4.5
and x2(u) < 1, and for all time v in [2.3, u), x1(u) is greater than 10.
We write x |= ϕ as a shorthand of (x, 0) |= ϕ. Formal semantics can be found in [55].
Parametric Signal Temporal Logic (PSTL) is an extension of STL introduced in [5] to define
template formulas containing unknown parameters. Syntactically speaking, a PSTL formula is an
STL formula where numeric constants, either in the constraints given by the predicates µ or in the
time intervals of the temporal operators, can be replaced by symbolic parameters. These parameters
are divided into two types:
• A scale parameter pi is a parameter appearing in predicates of the form µ = f(x) ∼ pi,
• A time parameter τ is a parameter appearing in an interval of a temporal operator.
An STL formula is obtained by pairing a PSTL formula with a valuation function that assigns a
value to each symbolic parameter. For example, consider the PSTL formula ϕ(pi, τ) = [0,τ ]x > pi,
with symbolic parameters pi (scale) and τ (time). The STL formula [0,10]x > 1.2 is an instance of
ϕ obtained with the valuation v = {τ 7→ 10, pi 7→ 1.2}.
5.1 Design Space Exploration: Case Study
Our design flow, pictorially represented in Fig. 5.1, consists of two main steps, namely topology design
and control design. The topology design step instantiates electric power system components and
connections among them to generate an optimal topology while guaranteeing the desired reliability
level. Given this topology, a reactive control logic can then be synthesized in the control design phase,
to drive contactors while guaranteeing that loads are correctly powered. The above two steps are,
however, connected. The correctness of the controller needs to be enforced in conjunction with its
boundary conditions, i.e. the assumptions on the entities that are not controlled, yet interact with it.
An example of such an assumption is the number of paths from generators to a load made available
by the electric power system architecture to the controller. Similarly, the reliability of an architecture
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Figure 5.1: Proposed electric power system topology and control design flow.
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must be assessed in conjunction with the assumptions for the controller to adequately configure its
contactors and leverage the available paths. Therefore, to achieve independent implementability
of architecture and controller, we address the synthesis problem in a compositional way, by using
contracts to incorporate the information on the environment conditions under which each entity is
expected to operate.
Our design process includes a top-down and a bottom-up phase. In the top-down phase, we
associate the requirements to the different entities in the system and formulate top-down vertical
contracts for them. In the bottom-up phase, we build a library of components including, for in-
stance, generators, buses, power converters and contactors. Each component is characterized by
its attributes, including multiple models or views, such as behavioral or reliability views, and finite
state machine (FSM) or continuous-time models. Horizontal contracts specify legal compositions
between these models. Bottom-up vertical contracts define under which conditions the models are
a faithful representation of the physical elements in the system.
In what follows, we provide details on the electric power system design space exploration.
5.1.1 Electric Power System
There is currently no automated procedure for optimal synthesis of control protocols simultaneously
subject to reliability, safety and real-time performance constraints. Therefore, we aim to reason
about these three aspects of the design, by using specialized analysis and synthesis frameworks
operating using different formalisms. Contracts specifying the interface between components and
views help transfer requirements between different frameworks and verify correctness with respect
to the full set of requirements. Our design space exploration is organized as follows:
a) From system requirements, we generate a set of constraints for the electric power system archi-
tecture. Safety, connectivity and power flow constraints are expressed as arithmetic constraints
on Boolean variables (mixed integer-linear inequalities); reliability constraints are inequalities
on real numbers involving component failure probabilities. Such constraints encode both the
guarantees offered by the architecture as well as the assumptions on the underlying control
protocol (horizontal contracts between the plant and its controller). The trade-off between re-
dundancy and cost can then be explored and an electric power system topology is synthesized
to minimize the total component cost while satisfying the constraints above. The synthesized
topology serves as a specification for the subsequent control design step.
b) The original high-level electric power system specifications are translated into LTL formulas for
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Table 5.1: Load Requirements
Component Requirement (W)
LL1 3000
LL2 4000
RL1 2000
RL2 3000
Table 5.2: Generator Power Ratings
Component Capability (W)
LG1 7000
LG2 3000
RG1 5000
RG2 4000
APU 10000
the topology generated in a). Using the results from Chapters 3-4, a reactive control protocol
is then synthesized from LTL constructs and made available as one (or more) state machines,
satisfying safety specifications by construction. However, no notion of the architectural and
real-time constraints (e.g. timing) related to the physical plant and the hardware implemen-
tation of the control algorithm are available at this level. In this work, timing constraints are
handled at a lower abstraction level, as detailed below.
c) The architecture in a) and the controller in b) are executed using continuous-time behavioral
models to check for their compatibility (horizontal contracts) and assess satisfaction of all the
requirements at a lower abstraction level. LTL requirements are refined into STL formulas.
Simulation traces are monitored to verify and optimize the controller. As an example, an
optimal clock period can be selected in the presence of delays in the switches and under the
assumption of a synchronous implementation. The resulting architecture and controller pair
is then returned as the final design.
5.1.2 Topology Synthesis
We illustrate our methodology on the proof-of-concept design of the primary power distribution of
an electric power system, involving the configuration of contactors to deliver power to high-voltage
AC and DC buses and loads.
The topology synthesis algorithm has been implemented in Matlab and leverages Cplex [1]
to solve the MILP at each iteration. We present the result obtained for an electric power system
topology template T consisting of two generators, two AC buses, two rectifiers, two DC buses and
two loads on each side. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the load power requirements and the generator
power ratings in our example; Table 5.3 shows the component costs, while the failure probabilities
are reported in Table 5.4.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the topologies obtained after running the synthesis algorithm when a
set of strategies to increase reliability are sequentially implemented after every MILP iteration. By
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Table 5.3: Component Costs
Component Cost
Generator Generator power/10
APU APU power/10
AC-Bus 200
Rectifier 200
DC-Bus 200
Contactor 100
Table 5.4: Component failure probabilities
Component Failure Probability
Generator/APU 10−5
AC/DC bus 0
Rectifier 2× 10−4
contactor, load 0
Figure 5.2: Directed graph representation of an electric power system architecture. Unconnected
nodes represent virtual components.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5.3: Topologies 2 (a), 3 (b) and 4 (c).
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Table 5.5: Failure Probability at Load LL1 for Topologies 1-4
Topology Failure Probability
1 2.3× 10−4
2 4.5× 10−8
3 4.5× 10−8
4 1× 10−12
solving the MILP including only connectivity and power flow constraints, we obtain the topology
in Fig. 5.2, the simplest possible architecture, which only provides a single path from a load to a
generator (or APU) on each side. Such a topology presents the lowest reliability level at its loads,
as shown in Table 5.5.
In Fig. 5.3 a) and b) horizontal connections are added between the DC buses and AC buses of the
left and right hand sides of the system. Since increasing the number of components is expensive, the
algorithm first tries to increase reliability by just adding connections among existing components
at the only cost of additional contactors. Additional components (e.g. buses and rectifiers) are
finally used in Fig. 5.3 c). In Table 5.5, we report the reliability (failure probability) at load LL1,
as computed for the topologies in Fig. 5.2 and 5.3.
In a typical run, the number of necessary paths to increase reliability is estimated at the first
MILP step and convergence to the final topology occurs in no more than two iterations.
5.1.3 Control Synthesis
For each of the four topologies in Figures 5.2-5.3, we formalize a set of environment assumptions
and system specifications to synthesize a control protocol. For the purpose of brevity, we present
the variables and formal specifications, written in LTL, for the topology depicted in Fig. 5.3 b) only.
Environment Variables: Generators LG1, LG2, APU1 and rectifier units LR2 and RR2 are un-
controlled variables that can switch between healthy (1) and unhealthy (0).
Controlled Variables: Contactors Ci,j1 (depicted only as wires in Fig. 5.3) are variables that are
set to open (0) or closed (1).
Dependent Variables: Buses are either powered (1) or unpowered (2) depending on the status of
environment and controlled variables.
Environment Assumption: For an overall system reliability of 10−9, no more than one generator
1i and j denote the name of the components contactor Ci,j connects.
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and one rectifier unit may be unhealthy at any given time. This is written as
((LG1 + LG2 +APU1) ≥ 2)
∧ ((LR2 +RR2) ≥ 1).
No Paralleling of AC Sources: No combination of contactors can be closed so that a path exists
between generators.
¬((CLG1,LB2 = 1) ∧ (CAPU1,LB2 = 1))
∧ ¬((CAPU1,RB2 = 1) ∧ (CRG1,RB2 = 1)).
Power Status of Buses: A bus can only be powered if there exists a path (in which a contactor is
closed) between a bus and a generator. In Fig. 5.3 b), bus LB2 is powered if either generator LG1
or APU1 is powered, and the contactor between generator and bus is closed.
((LG1 = 1) ∧ (CLG1,LB2 = 1)→ (LB2 = 1))
((APU1 = 1) ∧ (CAPU1,LB2 = 1)→ (LB2 = 1)).
If neither of these two cases is true, then LB2 will be unpowered. These specifications are written
as
(¬(((LG1 = 1) ∧ (CLG1,LB2 = 1)
∨((APU1 = 1) ∧ (CAPU1,LB2 = 1)))→ (LB2 = 0)).
Similar specifications may be written for buses RB2, LD2, and RD1.
Safety-Criticality of Buses: We consider all buses to be safety-critical, so that at no time can
any bus be unpowered
((LB2 = 1) ∧ (RB2 = 1) ∧ (LD2 = 1) ∧ (RD1 = 1)).
The resulting controller has 32 states with a computation time of 1.6 seconds on a Powerbook
2.2 GHz Intel Core Processor.
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5.1.4 Distributed Synthesis
Given a global specification and a system composed of subsystems, distributed synthesis proceeds
by first finding local specifications for each subsystem, and then synthesizing local controllers for
these subsystems separately. If the local specifications satisfy certain conditions, it can be shown
that the local controllers realizing these local specifications can be implemented together and the
overall system is guaranteed to satisfy the global specification, as detailed in [67]. We describe below
a special case of distributed architecture, i.e. a serial interconnection of controllers, which is used in
the design in Section 5.1.4.1 to synthesize controllers for AC and DC subsystems separately.
Theorem 5.1.1 Given
• a system characterized by a set S = P ∪ E of variables, where P and E are disjoint sets of
controllable and environment variables,
• its two subsystems with variables S1 = P1 ∪ E1 and S2 = P2 ∪ E2, where for each i ∈ {1, 2},
Pi and Ei are disjoint sets of controllable and environment variables for the ith subsystem, P1
and P2 are disjoint, and P = P1 ∪ P2,
• a set I of pairs of variables representing the interconnection structure, that is, for a serial
interconnection, I = {(o1, i2)|o1 ∈ O1 ⊆ (P1 ∪ E1), i2 ∈ I2 ⊆ E2}, where for all (o, i) ∈ I,
o = i,
• a global specification ϕe → ϕs, and two local specifications ϕe1 → ϕs1 and ϕe2 → ϕs2 , where
ϕe, ϕe1 , ϕe2 , ϕs, ϕs1 , and ϕs2 are LTL formulas containing variables only from their respective
sets of environment variables E, E1, E2 and system variables S, S1, S2;
if the following conditions hold:
1. any behavior that satisfies ϕe also satisfies (ϕe1 ∧ ϕe2),
2. any behavior that satisfies (ϕs1 ∧ ϕs2) also satisfies ϕs,
3. there exist two controllers that make the local specifications (ϕe1 → ϕs1) and (ϕe2 → ϕs2) true
with ϕe1 and ϕe2 both true;
then, implementing the two controller together leads to a controller that satisfies the global specifica-
tion ϕe → ϕs.
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Proof: The conditions on P , P1, P2 ensure that the two controllers are composable, i.e. they do not
try to control the same output (controllable) variables. We first define the following sets of behaviors
in terms of assumptions and guarantees:
A = {σ : σ |= ϕe}; Ai = {σ : σ |= ϕei};
G = {σ : σ |= ϕs}; Gi = {σ : σ |= ϕsi}.
Let S = (A,G ∪ ¬A) be the contract for the global specification and S1 = (A1, G1 ∪ ¬A1),
S2 = (A2, G2 ∪ ¬A2) be the ones for the local specifications, all in saturated form. Since any
implementations of S1 and S2 are composable, contract composition using equations (5.1) and (5.2)
is well defined.
We first prove that
S1 ⊗ S2  S,
i.e., S1 ⊗ S2 = (A12, G12) refines S. By the definition of refinement, this amounts to showing that
G12 ⊆ G ∪ ¬A and A12 ⊇ A. We obtain
G12 = (G1 ∪ ¬A1) ∩ (G2 ∪ ¬A2)
= (G1 ∩G2) ∪ (G1 ∩ ¬A2) ∪ (¬A1 ∩G2) ∪ (¬A1 ∩ ¬A2)
⊆ G ∪ ¬A2 ∪ ¬A1 (5.4)
= G ∪ ¬(A1 ∩A2) ⊆ G ∪ ¬A,
where we have used that (G1 ∩ G2) ⊆ G by condition 2 in the theorem statement, and ¬A ⊇
¬(A1 ∩A2) (or, equivalently, A ⊆ (A1 ∩A2)) by condition 1. Moreover
A12 = A1 ∩A2 ∪ ¬G12
= A1 ∩A2 ∪ ¬(G1 ∪ ¬A1) ∪ ¬(G2 ∪ ¬A2)
= A1 ∩A2 ∪ (¬G1 ∩A1) ∪ (¬G2 ∩A2) (5.5)
⊇ A1 ∩A2 ⊇ A
by condition 1. Equations (5.4) and (5.5) allow us to conclude that S1 ⊗ S2 refines S, hence any
implementations of S1 and S2 satisfy the global specification.
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However, for the composite contract to be well defined, we must also show that S1 ⊗ S2 is
compatible, i.e. there exists an environment that satisfies the composite contract or, equivalently,
A12 = {σ|σ |= ϕA12} is not empty, where
ϕA12 = (ϕe1 ∧ ϕe2) ∨ (ϕe1 ∧ ¬ϕs1) ∨ (ϕe2 ∧ ¬ϕs2). (5.6)
By condition 3, there exist behaviors that make the second and third term of the above disjunction
false and the first term true. Therefore, ϕA12 is satisfiable and S1 ⊗ S2 is compatible. 
There are two sources of conservatism in distributed synthesis. The first one is due to the fact that
local controllers have only local information. Therefore, even if there exists a centralized controller
that realizes a global specification, there may not exist local controllers that do so. This is an
inherent problem and can only be addressed by modifying the control architecture (e.g., by changing
the mapping of controlled variables to controllers, by introducing new sensors, or by modifying the
information flow between local controllers).
The second source of conservatism is rather computational. Even when local controllers that
realize the global specification exist, it might be difficult to find them (e.g., see [71] for some un-
decidability results). We note that the conditions provided in Theorem 5.1.1 are only sufficient
conditions. The choices of ϕej and ϕsj for j ∈ {1, 2} plays a role in the level of conservatism. Hence,
when conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied but condition 3 is not satisfied, one can gradually refine the
local specifications.
5.1.4.1 Results
For the single-line diagram in Fig. 5.3, the distributed control synthesis problem can be solved
by splitting the topology into two subsystems S1 and S2. The sets ES1 , SS1 , and ES2 , SS2 con-
tain all environment and system variables for subsystems S1 and S2, respectively. ES1 is com-
posed of generators LG1, APU1 and RG1. SS1 contains AC buses LB2, RB2, and contactors
CLG1,LB2, CAPU1,LB2, CRG1,RB2, CLB2,RB2. ES2 is composed of rectifiers LR2, RR2 and AC buses
LB2, RB2, while SS2 contains DC buses LD2, RD1 and contactors CLR2,LD2, CRR2,RD1, CLD2,RD1.
We assume the link between AC buses and rectifier units is a solid wire.
The environment assumption ϕeS1 for subsystem S1 enforces that at least one generator will
always remain healthy. Environment assumption ϕeS2 enforces that at least one rectifier unit will
always remain healthy. In addition, it also assumes that both AC buses will always be powered. This
is an additional guarantee S1 must provide to S2 for the distributed synthesis problem to become
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Table 5.6: Topology Reliability
Topology No. Comp. Reliability
1 9 2× 10−4
2 9 4× 10−8
3 9 4× 10−8
4 13 2× 10−14
realizable. All other specifications remain the same as the centralized control problem.
The synthesized controllers for S1 and S2 contains 4 and 8 states, respectively. Each controller
has a computation time of approximately 0.5 seconds on a Powerbook 2.2 GHz Intel Core Processor.
5.1.4.2 Reliability Results
Consider again an electric power system topology in which generators, APUs, and rectifier units may
fail with a probability of 10−5, 10−5, and 2 × 10−4, respectively. The environment assumption is
designed based on the overall aircraft reliability level. For different topologies, however, the synthesis
problem may still be realizable for higher reliability levels. If the synthesis problem is realizable for
all possible failure conditions that occur with probability greater than 10−x per hour (which can then
be converted to allowable environment behaviors), then the controlled system’s failure rate would
be less than 10−x per hour. For the topologies shown in Fig. 5.2 and 5.3, we perform a line-search
on x to determine the highest reliability level for which the synthesis problem is still realizable, with
the specification that all DC loads must always be powered. Table 5.6 lists these levels alongside the
number of components within each topology. Note that reliability level increases as the number of
edges in the topology increase, which corresponds to the number of paths that exist to continuously
power DC loads.
5.1.5 Real-Time Performance
Continuous-time models are implemented in Simulink, by exploiting the SimPowerSystems extension.
As an example, the continuous-time model of a generator consists of a mechanical engine (turbine), a
three-phase synchronous machine, in addition to the GCU, driving the field voltage of the generator.
A bottom-up vertical contract specifies the range of voltage and frequencies for which this reduced-
order model is an accurate representation of the actual electro-mechanical component. In addition
to timing properties, our power network model allows measuring current and voltage levels at the
different circuit loads. It can be discretized to speed up simulations and can seamlessly interface
also with StateFlow models for the controller.
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Figure 5.4: Real-time requirement violation due to a generator fault.
Figure 5.4 shows the simulated voltage VLD2 of bus LD2 in topology 3 (Fig. 5.3 b)) as a function
of time, when the left generator LG1 fails, Tclk = 20 ms and Td = 40 ms. The waveforms at the top
and bottom of the figure are the voltage signals at the LB2 (AC) and LD2 (DC) buses, respectively.
Both the AC and DC voltages decay to zero because of the fault. The red waveform at the bottom of
the figure is interpreted as a Boolean signal, which can be high (one) or low (zero). The requirement
violation suggests that the controller clock frequency should be increased to make the controlled
system more “reactive” to a left generator fault.
The Tclk versus Td design space is explored in Fig. 5.5 and 5.6 by leveraging a Monte Carlo based
sampling scheme. The latter plot represents the amount of elapsed time τ∗e while the DC bus voltage
is out of range, i.e. for how long the requirement on the DC bus is violated. Such a violation period
is then compared with the hard threshold tmax = 50 ms in Fig. 5.5, thus providing the designer with
a “safe” region (marked in green in Fig. 5.5) for selecting the controller clock as a function of the
contactor delay. As an example, for Td = 20 ms the maximum BPCU reaction time allowed for safe
operation is 45 ms.
5.2 Hardware Testbed
While in the previous section we verified controllers in simulation using Breach and Signal Temporal
Logic, in this section we report on our simulation models and a hardware testbed for validating
reactive controllers synthesized using TuLiP [90] and Simulink [83]. in order to investigate the
validity of the assumptions made in controller synthesis. The particular distributed synthesis method
adopted in this section follows exposition in [67] and [68] as well as from Section 5.1.4. The work
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Figure 5.6: Duration of requirement violation.
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described in the rest of this chapter was performed jointly with Robert Rogersten, Necmiye Ozay,
and Ufuk Topcu.
University-scale testbeds for research on correct-by-construction controller synthesis are fairly
limited. An advanced diagnostics and prognostics testbed is described in [75]. Some applications of
this testbed to the electric power systems of spacecraft and aircraft are detailed in [58]. However,
the experiments focused on diagnostic queries of the system, while our work is focused on the
implementation of correct-by-construction control protocols for fault-tolerant operations. A robotics
testbed implementing correct-by-construction controllers is described in [52].
The safety requirements used in simulation models and the hardware testbed follow the descrip-
tion in Section 4.3 and stipulate that the alternating current generators should never be paralleled
and that the duration for which the bus is not powered should never exceed a certain limit. They
also include the environment-related assumption that at least a subset of the generators and rectifier
units must be working at all times. The simulation models were built with the physical modeling
software SimPowerSystems, an extension of Simulink [83]. In order to validate the controller on
the experimental hardware platform, we synthesized and tested it using TuLiP and SimPowerSys-
tems, respectively. Thereafter, we investigated the validity of the assumptions used for controller
synthesis on the experimental hardware platform.
An aircraft electric power system uses different voltage levels, which can broadly be divided
into four categories: high-voltage AC, high-voltage DC, low-voltage AC, and low-voltage DC. The
topology in Figure 5.7 is of specific interest because it is representative of some of the key features
of aircraft electric power systems in simplified settings. Therefore, the hardware testbed was built
based on the above mentioned topology.
5.2.1 Testbed Specifications
Consider the single-line diagram in Figure 5.7 in which environment variables are health statuses of
generators and rectifier units, and controlled variables are the state of contactors. Consider also two
different controller implementations: a centralized logic that runs the system with a single automaton
and a distributed logic that has two different automata, one for the AC subsystem and one for the
DC subsystem, running sequentially.
For the centralized logic, the specifications follow from equations (4.9) - (4.16). In particular, the
environment assumptions maintains that at least one generator and one rectifier unit must always
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Figure 5.7: Single-line diagram of the power system testbed. Contactors are represented by double
bars. The AC and DC sides of the system are separated by rectifier units (RU).
be healthy, written as
{((g1 = 1) ∨ (g2 = 1)) ∧ ((r1 = 1) ∨ (r2 = 1))}. (5.7)
To synthesize distributed logic, we separate the system into two subsystems, seen in Figure 5.7.
The AC subsystem contains all AC components (generators, AC contactors, AC buses, and loads).
The DC subsystem contains all rectifier units, DC contactors, buses, and loads. All specifications
from the centralized case decompose and carry over to the distributed case. However, in order to
ensure that the overall specification is realizable, we impose additional restrictions on the components
located at the interface between subsystems. The rectifier units contain capacitors that can be chosen
so that they create a delay TRU , in which the DC buses stays powered even after that an AC bus
gets unpowered.
If TRU > T the additional interface refinement comes in the form of a guarantee specification
that all DC buses bi, for i ∈ {1, 2} will always be powered (bi = 1), provided that both rectifier
units stay healthy, i.e.,
{(r1 = 1) ∧ (r2 = 1)}.
This guarantee is written as an environment for the DC subsystem. With this refinement, both
subsystems can be synthesized independently, and the overall system specifications are satisfied
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Figure 5.8: Sample of a TuLiP output in two-generator and three-contactor case. The generator
status variables are gen1 and gen2, and the contactor status variables are c1, c2, and c3. Each
state has successors, which define where the controller can transit depending on current state. In
addition, no-successor states exist.
when they are implemented together. We assume that the time a generator remains healthy is not
arbitrarily short so that the AC bus powered time (i.e., the time between two intervals when AC
bus is unpowered) is large enough to keep the capacitors on rectifier units charged.
5.2.2 Implementing Formal Specifications
TuLiP generates finite-state automata in the form of a text file that enumerates the possible states
of the system and how the transitions could be carried out according to the current state. It also
generates a text file that specifies environment variables (e.g., generators and rectifier units) and
system variables (e.g., contactors). In order to implement the control logic in SimPowerSystems,
we automatically translate these files into a Matlab-compatible script. A preliminary solution uses
a Python script for this translation. A Python script generating the Matlab code is released with
TuLiP version 0.3c under the tools directory2.
Figure 5.8 shows an example four-state TuLiP generated controller for the two-generator and
three-contactor case. A few lines of the auto-generated code that corresponds to this controller is
shown in Figure 5.9. The auto-generated code can be inserted in SimPowerSystems as a Matlab
function block. It can also be connected to the board with the code shown in Figure 5.10.
5.2.3 Design and Implementation
The single-line diagram in Figure 5.7 is a simplified notation for representing a three-phase power
system. However, as described in Section 5.2.4, the power supply for the hardware testbed is not
three-phase. In order to represent the installations of the sensors, circuit protection devices, and
2http://tulip-control.sf.net
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Figure 5.9: Sample code generated using TuLiP controller shown in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.10: Code that implements the control software running on hardware model.
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Figure 5.11: Hardware setup corresponding to the single-line diagram shown in Figure 2.1.
fault injection switches, we present a detailed schematic of the testbed in Figure 5.12. Descriptions
of the components shown in Figure 5.12 are given in Figure 5.13.
The hardware testbed has two different voltage levels: 24 VAC and 2.5 VDC. The DC section
is connected to the AC section by rectifier units. Aircraft contactors are designed to switch three-
phase electric power with relatively high currents. Relays are generally used for switching lower
currents. These operate in a similar fashion to contactors but are lighter, simpler, and less expensive.
Therefore, it was more convenient to handle the switching in the hardware model with relays. It
was possible to connect the control logic to the relays with the use of a relay board, which is a set
of computer-controlled relays that can communicate with programming languages supporting serial
communications, e.g., Matlab. Analog-to-digital (A/D) connections on the relay board are used to
monitor the system conditions. A photo of the setup is shown in Figure 5.11. The transformers in
Figure 5.11 are connected to power cords; these can be unplugged to simulate a generator failure.
The rectifier units are connected to a switch, which can be used to generate a fault on the DC
subsystem. Next, we describe how we monitor and sense the status of generators and rectifier units.
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(a) Circuit Schematic.
(b) Sensing configuration
Figure 5.12: Circuit schematic of the hardware testbed, which corresponds to the single-line dia-
gram shown in Figure 2.1. The numbered arrows in (a) denote voltage sensing connections to the
corresponding numbered arrows in (b).
99
Figure 5.13: Description of the components used in Figure 5.12.
5.2.4 Generation and Circuit Protection
Each generation unit consists of a 12 V battery connected to an inverter that generates 120 VAC;
that is then transformed down to 24 VAC to ensure safety. If the controller violates one of the
safety requirements and connects these two sources in parallel, it would result in a short-circuit and
cause excessive currents in the fuses installed next to the generators, shown in Figure 5.12(a). This
observation makes it possible to monitor the correctness of the controllers at run time.
5.2.5 Sensing
The relay board needs to react consistently to faults injected into the system; this requirement
implies that sensor placement, functionality, accuracy, and time delay play crucial roles in design.
Two types of faults can be injected in the system, namely, rectifier unit failures and generator
failures. Voltage sensing for generator failures is handled using additional relays. These relays close
a 3.6 V circuit to a battery when triggered by the voltage from the transformers. If a fault occurs
and a generator does not work properly, the 3.6 V circuit opens and the system reacts accordingly.
The voltage sensors of the rectifier units are directly connected to the A/D ports of the relay board
because the voltage can be tuned to the appropriate value using an adjustable output on the rectifier
units. Figure 5.12(b) illustrates the sensing configuration on the testbed.
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Tc [ms] T ′c [ms]
Mean 303.7 187.5
Max 333.3 234.1
Min 282.5 166.6
Table 5.7: Control cycle time, both when relay configuration changes, i.e., Tc and without any
change, i.e., T ′c. The values with and without change were calculated from 20 and 250 measurements,
respectively.
5.3 Experiments
We next describe the characteristics of the hardware testbed and show some preliminary test runs
with different control architectures.
5.3.1 Testbed Characteristics
The first step before the implementation and testing of different controllers is characterizing the
timing properties of the hardware testbed. Every relay has a time delay between the time a command
is sent by the computer and the time an action (i.e., relay opening or closing) is taken, this is referred
to as the relay delay time, Td. Furthermore, the system has delays resulting from control cycle times,
Tc and T ′c, defined as
Tc = Tr + TI + Tw
T ′c = Tr + TI ,
(5.8)
where Tr is the time it takes to read the health statuses from all of the four environment variables,
TI is the time it takes to run the logic (the time can be interpreted as the time taken to run the code
shown in Figure 5.9), and Tw is the time it takes to write information to the board (see Figure 5.10).
Writing information to the board is not needed in every iteration (for instance, if the system state
remains the same), therefore the control cycle time also include T ′c.
The control cycle times Tc and T ′c are listed in Table 5.7. The relay delay time can be found
from the board specifications and shall be less than 20 ms.
An important safety requirement in an aircraft is that a bus should never lose power for more
than a certain duration, e.g., typically 50 ms. In the hardware testbed, the time for which the
bus is unpowered depends on the control cycle times and the relay delay time, and because the
control cycle times exceed 50 ms, we cannot use the typically specified time for which an aircraft
can be unpowered. Therefore, it was necessary to adopt a suitable limit. As illustrated with two
environment variables in Figure 5.10 the relay board read the health status from each environment
variable in a specified order. It is therefore necessary to include a part of T ′c from the previous
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control cycle in this limit. The time TI in equation (5.8) is negligible compared to Tr and Tw, the
time taken to read the health status from one environment variable can therefore be approximated
as T ′c/4. A reasonable value of an acceptable unpowered time for the hardware testbed can be
T ≈ max (Td) + max (Tc) + 4− n
4
max (T ′c), (5.9)
where n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is the number which denotes the order of when the environment variable that
is faulty is read in the code.
5.3.2 Controller Tests
Two controllers were tested, one with distributed logic and one with centralized logic. The controller
with centralized logic had a 16-state automaton synthesized as explained in Section 5.2.1. The
controller with distributed logic had two four-state automata that run on each subsystem. Both of
these automata were synthesized in a similar fashion to the 16-state controller.
If the environment-related assumption is violated, the controller may end up in a state with no
outgoing transitions, referred to as the no-successor state. The environment-related assumptions for
the testbed are expressed in equation (5.7) of Section 5.2.1. A violation of equation (5.7) results in
the controller entering a no-successor state, which happens when both generators or both rectifier
units are faulty. If a centralized controller senses that both rectifier units are faulty, the whole system
stops working because a no-successor state has been reached. This is not the case when distributed
logic is used, because the AC system continues working even if the DC environment assumption is
violated and the DC part reaches a no-successor state. The distributed logic implementation has two
different automata that represent the logic, one for each subsystem, with coupling between them.
However, the distributed logic is centralized in that it consists of single control software running on
a single computer and communicating with the hardware through a single channel.
Figure 5.14 shows the voltage measurement for the centralized 16-state controller. The measure-
ment was taken on the AC bus when the generator, which health status is read at second place
(n = 2 in equation (5.9)) of the four environment variables in the code, was switched off and then on
again. The generator was switched off at t = 2.83 s, at which point the bus becomes unpowered. The
second vertical line from the left indicates when the controller reacts and power up the bus using the
other generator, which happens at t = 3.1 s. The generator was switched on again at t = 3.73 s; this
was accompanied by a discernible change in the sine curve. Once a generator is switched on again
after a fault, the time for which the bus is without power is not noticeable because the controller
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Figure 5.14: Bus voltage measurement when a generator is switched off and then turned back on.
The first vertical line indicates the fault, the second vertical line is when the controller reacts, and
the third line is when the generator is turned back on.
Bus-unpowered time [ms]
Mean 333.9
Max 414.9
Min 232.7
Table 5.8: Time for which bus is unpowered after a fault is injected. These values are calculated
using measurements from 10 fault injections.
sends simultaneous commands to two relays.
The measured bus-unpowered times are listed in Table 5.8, which show a maximum value of
Tmax = 414.9 ms. An acceptable unpowered time when n = 2 and max (Td) = 20 ms can be
calculated with equation (5.9). It follows that T ≈ max (Td)+max (Tc)+ 12 max (T ′c) = 470.35 ms and
hence, Tmax < T . We used a digital storage oscilloscope (Rigol DS1052E 50MHz) for measurements.
The measurement data are imported intoMatlab for analysis and to estimate the unpowered times.
5.4 Conclusions
We have applied a rigorous platform-based methodology to the design of an aircraft electric power
system. Our flow consists of three main phases: topology synthesis, control synthesis, and simulation-
based design space exploration and verification. To express system requirements, we adopt different
formalisms supported by specialized synthesis and analysis frameworks. To generate the system
topology, we cast a mixed integer-linear program that minimizes the overall cost while satisfying a
set of connectivity, power flow and reliability requirements, expressed in terms of linear arithmetic
constraints on Boolean variables and probabilistic constraints. To generate a correct-by-construction
controller for a given topology, we leverage results from reactive synthesis from linear temporal logic
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specifications. We then refine these LTL specifications into signal-temporal logic constructs to
assess the real-time system performance and explore the design space at a lower abstraction level,
based on high fidelity behavioral models. Our compositional approach uses contracts to guarantee
independent implementability of system topology and control, since both topology synthesis and
control synthesis rely on a consistent set of models and design constraints.
As a future work, we will extend our control synthesis algorithms to support richer formal lan-
guages (e.g., timed logic, branching logic), continuous-time specifications and continuous dynamics
(e.g., transients, network and communication delays). Moreover, we plan to investigate techniques
for automatic generation of local contracts for the synthesis of distributed and hierarchical control
architectures.
As an extension, we plan to build more representative Simulink models that match the hardware
characteristics (e.g., voltage ranges, timing delays), and synthesize controllers that are consistent
with the timing characterization of the hardware. Simulink has embedded controller simulation add-
ons with sensor communication networks that can make simulation models more realistic. Future
work can test out ”truly” distributed controllers in simulation, which we were unable to perform in
hardware due to a single relay board. A simulation model that takes into account the implementation
platform would better reflect software challenges.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic State Estimation
This chapter explores the design problem of state estimation based on sensor placement for a given
electric power system topology. Section 6.1 provides a brief overview of the state estimation problem
for electric power systems. Sections 6.2 introduces the problem setup and mathematical concepts
and notation used throughout the rest of the chapter. Section 6.3 proposes a mathematical strategy
to determine the state of the system from sensor measurements and gives a worst-case performance
bound for the strategy. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 present the problem implementation and shows results
for example circuits (i.e., topologies). This chapter is joint work with Quentin Maillet and Necmiye
Ozay.
6.1 Overview
Previous work in electric power system state estimation has focused on static, centralized estima-
tion problems with continuous states. We perform discrete state estimation using active control
of switches within the electric power system in a distributed control architecture. The system re-
configures itself through a set of controllable contactors (i.e., electrically controlled switches). Once
reconfigured, new sensor measurements are taken to gain more information about the unknown state.
We adaptively sequence switching actions by use of a greedy strategy that maximizes the one-step
expected uncertainty reduction. By exploiting recent results in adaptive submodularity [34, 47],
we provide theoretical bounds for the worst-case performance of the greedy strategy for a uniform
probability distribution along states. Such dynamic state estimation techniques have been proposed
in the context of Markov jump linear systems [14], information gathering in robotics [61,84], active
hypothesis testing [65], and active learning [37]. To the best of our knowledge, these ideas have not
been applied before in electric power system state estimation and fault diagnosis problems.
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A critical assumption in recent work [67, 88, 92] is that the high-level reactive control protocol
has an accurate knowledge of the system states, including fault states so that it can reroute the
power accordingly. An expensive, hence undesirable, solution to achieve accurate state estimates
is to equip the system with a large number of sensors. The more sensors present in the system,
makes maintenance more difficult, as well as adds more weight to the aircraft. Software, however,
is cheaper and more amenable to change than hardware. The goal of this chapter is to obtain
high-accuracy state estimates with a limited number of sensors by utilizing software-based dynamic
estimation strategies. We are particularly interested in detecting and localizing faults in the system.
It is common to use discrete models for fault diagnosis [80]. Therefore, continuous values of voltage
and current, as well as health statuses of components in the system are discretized before performing
state estimation. A discrete framework is also well-suited for combining the proposed estimation
strategy with control synthesis results as discussed in Chapter 3.
6.2 Problem Setup
6.2.1 General Problem Description
Consider an aircraft electric power system topology, which can be represented by a graph data
structure G = (N , E). Let Figure 6.1 be the representative circuit topology. The set of nodes
N = {n1, . . . , nnn} in the graph representation contains the following components: generators (G),
rectifier units (R), and voltage sensors (S). The set of edges E = {e1, . . . , ene} contains all contactors
(and solid wire links) between components. The status of contactors in E can either be open or closed.
A node corresponding to a rectifier unit has no outgoing edges on the AC side and no incoming edges
on the DC side to reflect the fact that they contain a diode (i.e., power is unidirectional). The rest
of the edges in the graph are bidirectional.
Elements in the set of generators G ⊆ N and rectifier units R ⊆ N are uncontrollable, and can
take values of
1. Unhealthy (i.e., the component is online but outputting a voltage not in admissible range);
2. Healthy (i.e., the component is online and outputting the correct voltage);
3. Offline (i.e., no power output, open circuit).
Sensor measurements read from S ⊆ N , then, will depend on the status of generators, rectifier
units, and contactors. We define a live path between two components if there exists a simple path
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Figure 6.1: A single-line diagram of a simple circuit with AC and DC components.
in the graph G that connects the two nodes corresponding to these components, there is no offline
component along the path (including end nodes), and the contactors along this path are all closed.
The reading from a sensor s can then take the following values
1. Improper voltage: if there is a live path between sensor s and some generator g ∈ G (not offline
by definition of live path), but either g or rectifier r ∈ R along such a path is unhealthy;
2. Admissible voltage: for all g ∈ G that have a live path to s, both g and all rectifier units along
such paths are healthy;
3. No voltage: there exists no live path between sensor s and any generator g ∈ G.
The state x of the system is defined as a valuation on all components n ∈ G∪R and uncontrollable
contactors e ∈ C′ ⊆ C. We define Ω as the set of all states, i.e all the different valuations of the
components. The state x is unknown and hence modeled as a random variable X that can only be
determined by sensor measurements that are mapped back to a set of possible states in which the
circuit may be.
On top of the circuit and sensing topology is a distributed control architecture with a dynamic
state estimation mechanism. We assume that one of the embedded controllers is responsible for
dynamic state estimation, hereafter referred to as the fault detection controller. The fault detection
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controller is able to control a subset C \ C′ of contactors (e.g., those labelled with blue in Fig. 6.1).
The overall goal is to design a strategy the fault detection controller runs to adaptively estimate the
discrete state of the circuit by taking “actions” (i.e., closing and opening controllable contactors),
and then reading voltage sensor measurements.
6.2.2 Mathematical Formulation
In this section we introduce the relevant notations used throughout the rest of the paper and math-
ematically formulate the estimation problem.
The state X of the circuit is unknown and modeled as a random variable. Data on component
types and reliability levels can be used to build a probability measure P[x] on Ω. At the beginning of
the state estimation process the system is in the state x0 ∈ Ω. We assume that faults in the system
are independent, and that x0 remains fixed during the estimation process. This is a reasonable
assumption because the timescale of the estimation process is meant to be much smaller than the
failure rates of the components and the timescales of the other controllers in the system.
For the controllable subset of contactors, there exists a set V of actions v that can be performed
and a set Y of measurements y that can be observed. For an action v ∈ V, y = µ(v, x) is the
unique outcome of performing action v if the system is in the state x. The actions {v0, ..., vt}
performed and outcomes {y0, ..., yt} observed up until step t are represented by the partial realization
ψt = {(vi, yi)}i∈{0,...,t}. Given two partial realizations ψt and ψt′ , we say that ψt is a subrealization
of ψt′ if ψt ⊆ ψt′ . At each step t, the probability measure P[x] can be updated by conditioning it
on ψt to obtain P[x | ψt].
We are interested in an estimation process adaptively eliminating “invalid" states to get to the
actual state x0. We define D(y, v), with y = µ(v, x0), to be the set of states x ∈ Ω that are
indistinguishable from x0 under the action v. Formally,D(µ(v, x0), v) = {x ∈ Ω | µ(v, x) = µ(v, x0)}.
We further extend this concept by defining h(v0:t, x0), the set of states that produce the same set of
outcomes {µ(v0, x0), . . . , µ(vt, x0)} as x0 under the same set of actions {v0, . . . , vt}. In the remainder
of the paper, we use St as a shorthand for h(v0:t, x0). If, at step t, we perform a new action v′ /∈ ψt,
there exists a recursive relation between the two sets of states:
h(v0:t ∪ {v′}, x0) = h(v0:t, x0) ∩D(µ(v′, x0), v′), (6.1)
which leads immediately to
St = ∩i∈{0,...,t}D(µ(vi, x0), vi). (6.2)
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As only intersections are taken, the order of actions vi does not matter.
To represent the uncertainty in the state estimate, we define an objective function f : 2V×Y×Ω→
R+ that maps the set of actions A ⊆ V under state x0 to reward f(A, x0). A strategy pi is a function
from partial realizations to actions such that pi(ψt) is the action vt+1 taken by pi when observing ψt.
We denote V˜(pi, x0) ⊆ V the set of all the actions performed under the strategy pi, the state of the
system being x0. In the general case, V˜(pi, x0) 6= V.
The fault detection controller is assigned a budget k  |V|, the number of steps within which
the estimation process should terminate. The system is initially in the state x0, which is fixed and
unknown, and the controlled contactors are in some initial configuration v0. Initial configuration
v0 and the corresponding measurement y0 constitute ψ0. Then, for i = 1, . . . , k, we consider the
following process:
vi = pi(ψi−1) (6.3a)
yi = µ(vi, x0) (6.3b)
ψi = ψi−1 ∪ (vi, yi). (6.3c)
Equations (6.3a) - (6.3c) represent the decision making, measurement, and update in the estimation
process, respectively.
The goal is to reduce the uncertainty of X represented by the probability distribution P[x]
through performing k actions. To that end, the following reward function is considered:
f(v0:k, x0) = −P[Sk] = −
∑
x∈Sk
P[x]. (6.4)
The behavior driven by the maximization of f is to remove as much probability mass from Ω as
possible in k steps. It is also worth noting that when the underlying probability distribution on Ω
is uniform, f is just proportional to the size of Sk and so maximizing f is equivalent to minimizing
the number of indistinguishable states.
The goal of estimation is to find the strategy that allows the “best expected estimate” for the
state, i.e, the strategy pi∗ s.t.
pi∗ ∈ arg max
pi
E[f(V˜(pi,X), X)], (6.5)
subject to |V˜(pi, x)| 6 k for all x, and with expectation taken with respect to P[x].
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6.3 Strategy
In this section, we describe the algorithm used to solve the state estimation problem and give
performance guarantees on the worst-case execution.
6.3.1 Greedy strategy
To determine the optimal strategy for the fault detection controller, one should plan ahead for k
steps, yet complexity scales up exponentially with k. To address the problem efficiently we develop
a greedy strategy that selects, at each step, the action maximizing the expected one-step gain in
uncertainty reduction. The greedy strategy uses the information ψt gathered through the previous
measurements and the probability measure P[x | ψt] on the set St. This probability is computed
using a classic Bayesian update:
P[x | ψt] = P[ψt | x] P[x]
P[ψt]
, ∀ x ∈ Ω. (6.6)
As the measurement process is deterministic, for a given x ∈ Ω we have P[x | ψt] = 1{x∈St},
meaning that P[x | ψt] = 1 if x belongs to St, and P[x | ψt] = 0 otherwise. From (6.6) we then get:
P[x | ψt] =

P[x]
P[ψt]
∀ x ∈ St
0 elsewhere
(6.7)
The term P[ψt] is the same for all x. It is a normalization coefficient that can be computed using∑
x∈St P[x | ψt] = 1 to obtain
P[ψt] =
∑
x∈St
P[x]. (6.8)
At step t, the strategy consists of choosing the next action vt+1 that maximizes the gain in un-
certainty reduction. Our measure of uncertainty comes from the value of the function f , established
in Eq. (6.4), and therefore the benefit is expressed in terms of the change in f as we choose the
action v. Consistent with our goal, we choose to maximize in mean the benefit at each step, the
expectation taken with respect to the updated probability measure P[x | ψt]. We obtain the greedy
strategy:
vt+1 ∈ arg max
v∈V
E[f(v0:t ∪ {v}, X)− f(v0:t, X) | ψt]. (6.9)
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6.3.2 Performance Guarantees
Greedy strategies in general can perform arbitrarily badly [8]. However, by exploiting recent results
on adaptive submodularity, we give a lower bound on the performance of the proposed strategy. For
a brief overview of adaptive submodularity and related definitions, see Section 6.6. We next show
that the function f defined in Eq. (6.4), is adaptive monotone and adaptive submodular (Def. 6.6.2
and 6.6.3).
Proposition 6.3.1 The function f defined in Eq. (6.4) is adaptive monotone.
Proof: Given an action v ∈ V and partial realization ψt at step t, we need to show the expected
marginal benefit ∆(v|ψt) (see Def. 6.6.1) is nonnegative. For the cost function f , ∆(v|ψt) can be
written as:
∆(v | ψt) = E[f(v0:t, X) | ψt]− E[f(v0:t ∪ {v}, X) | ψt]. (6.10)
By Eq. (6.7), we get
∆(v | ψt) =
∑
x∈h(v0:t,x0)
P[x|ψt] φ(x), (6.11)
with
φ(x) =
∑
x˜∈h(v0:t,x)
P[x˜] −
∑
x˜∈h(v0:t∪{v},x)
P[x˜]. (6.12)
By Eq. (6.1), h(v0:t ∪ {v}, x) is a subset of h(v0:t, x) for every x ∈ Ω. Thus, φ(x) > 0, all the
terms in the sum in Eq. (6.11) are non-negative, and ∆(v|ψt) > 0. 
Proposition 6.3.2 The function f defined in Eq. (6.4) is adaptive submodular.
Proof: Given in Appendix 6.6.2. 
Theorem 6.3.3 For any true state x0 ∈ Ω, the uncertainty reduction achieved in k steps by the
greedy strategy given in Algorithm 1 is no worse than (1 − 1/e) of what can be achieved in k steps
by any other strategy, including the best possible strategy.
Proof: Follows directly from Propositions 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 and Theorem 6.6.4 given in Section 6.6. 
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6.4 Implementation
In this section, we give implementation details on the dynamic estimator employing the greedy strat-
egy on some typical aircraft electric power system topologies. In order to reduce online computation,
the inverse mapping from sensor measurements to compatible states of the circuit is conducted of-
fline. Additionally, we propose some abstraction rules to reduce the size of the circuit as well as
computation time.
6.4.1 Implementation Details
The overall estimation process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Adaptive greedy strategy
Input: Probability measure P[x] on Ω, number of actions to perform k. The system is in the state x0 ∈ Ω,
fixed and unknown, and the controlled contactors are in some configuration v0.
Output: Knowledge of the system ψk gathered after the k actions taken under the strategy pigreedy
1: Take the measurement y0 = µ(v0, x0).
2: ψ0 = {(v0, y0)}
3: for t ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
4: vt = pigreedy(ψt−1)
5: Perform action vt
6: Take the measurement yt = µ(vt, x0)
7: ψt = ψt−1 ∪ {vt, yt}
8: St = St−1 ∩D(yt, vt)
9: Compute P[x | ψt] (Bayesian update)
10: end for
11: return (ψk, Sk,P[x | ψk])
In this algorithm, some items can be precomputed to improve run time. In particular, the inverse
mapping from sensor measurements to compatible states does not have a closed form expression and
the computation of the inverse map involves searching for paths on the graphG = (N , E) representing
the circuit topology. Therefore, for all measurements y ∈ Y and all actions v ∈ V, the sets D(y, v)
of states consistent with the action-measurement pairs (v, y) are computed offline to achieve a faster
implementation. This collection is then accessed on the fly to significantly reduce the computation
time as it is the most costly part of the algorithm.
Assumptions about the components and circuit can be easily incorporated in our framework.
In particular, because these circuits are designed to achieve certain reliability levels, one common
assumption is that at least one generator and one rectifier unit are online (delivering correct or
improper voltage). These assumptions render certain states impossible, which are removed from the
initial state set Ω.
112
6.4.2 Model Reduction Via Abstraction
Although the greedy strategy provides an efficient way (with performance guarantees) to solve the
dynamic state estimation problem, the offline computation can be very demanding. In particular,
the number of possible states is exponential in the number of components whose states are being
estimated. Therefore, for complex circuit topologies, the offline computation of the sets D(y, v) for
all y ∈ Y and all actions v ∈ V is expensive. In this section, we give a set of rules that can be
recursively applied to reduce the size of the circuit by clustering certain components together into
metacomponents.
Components (generators, rectifier units, contactors) are connected through their ports to form
the circuit, and sensors are placed on some of these ports. The main reduction idea is that when two
uncontrolled components are connected together and there is no sensor on their internal connecting
port, some of the individual states of the components may become indistinguishable from what can
be measured with the available sensors. Therefore, they can be treated as a single basic component,
called a metacomponent, having the same global overall behavior. It is then possible to hierarchically
estimate the system state, first by estimating the state of the metacomponent, and then mapping
this state to possible states of individual components forming the metacomponent. When running
the greedy algorithm on the reduced circuit, the probabilities of metacomponent states should be
adjusted accordingly to ensure a lossless abstraction.
The rules we use to simplify the circuits are summarized in Fig. 6.2. Figure 6.2(a), for example,
shows how the combination of generator and contactor can be abstracted into a single “generator"
metacomponent. For the original combination of components, the contactor can either be open (o)
or closed (c), and the generator can either be healthy (h), unhealthy (u), or offline (o). Thus, the set
Ω has six possible states, represented as a tuple of contactor status and generator health: x1 = (c, h),
x2 = (c, u), x3 = (c, o), x4 = (o, h), x5 = (o, u), and x6 = (o, o). The “generator" metacomponent,
however, has three possible states, corresponding to healthy, unhealthy, and offline: x˜1 = h, x˜2 = u,
and x˜3 = o. These metacomponent states can be mapped back to the corresponding original
components, such that x˜1 = {x1}, x˜2 = {x2}, and x˜3 = {x3, x4, x5, x6}.
6.5 Examples
To assess the performance of the greedy strategy, we have systematically tested the greedy strategy
on diverse circuits that are representative of the standard and simple circuits used in electric power
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(a) Generator Metacomponent.
!"#
!"#
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(b) Rectifier Unit Metacomponent.
!" !"
(c) Contactor Metacomponent.
Figure 6.2: Metacomponents used for abstraction. In terms of possible external behaviors (i.e.,
what can be measured from the external ports), two-component circuit units (shown in black) are
equivalent to the single component units (shown in red).
systems.
In many cases it is not possible to completely eliminate the uncertainty on the state of the system
when there is a limited number of sensors. In order to evaluate the performance of the greedy
strategy, we compare it with a brute force strategy, which exhaustively tries every action v ∈ V . At
each step states inconsistent with measurements are eliminated, and the strategy terminates when
no action is left. No strategy that tries k < |V | actions can perform better than the brute force
strategy. Although the brute force strategy is not practically applicable, as |V | can be very large,
it gives an upper bound on achievable performance, and can be used as a benchmark. Overall test
methodology is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Test methodology
1: for φ0 ∈ Ω do
2: Set the whole circuit (controlled part as well as uncontrolled part) in the state φ0
3: Run the strategy tested (Greedy or brute force strategy)
4: Record the computation time and the value of f at the end for statistics.
5: end for
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Figure 6.3: Performance comparison between greedy and brute-force strategies.
6.5.1 Small Circuit Tests
The small circuit test configuration, shown in Fig. 6.1 is comprised of 12 components. Six com-
ponents are unknown (G1, G2, R1, R2, C2, C5), 4 contactors are controlled (C1, C3, C4, C6) and two
voltage sensors are available (S1 and S2). Taking into consideration reliability assumptions on faults,
the size of the state-space generated is 1600. A more precise description of the actual hardware cir-
cuit can be found in [77]. On this particular example, with four controlled contactors, the brute force
strategy performs the |V | = 24 = 16 actions. Both strategies have been run on the same MacBook
Pro 2.2 GHz Intel Core. As shown in Figure 6.3, the greedy strategy with a horizon length of k = 6
performs as well as the brute force strategy, i.e., the value of the objective function f at the end of
the 6 steps using the greedy strategy is the same as after the brute force strategy with 16 steps.
6.5.1.1 Average Execution Time
The average execution time for the greedy strategy is shown in Fig. 6.4. Online computation for the
next best action executes on the order of milliseconds, whereas the offline computation for database
set D takes 30 seconds for the small circuit.
6.5.1.2 Average Remaining States
Fig. 6.5 shows the distribution of the values of f after k = 6 steps for the greedy strategy. Beginning
with 1600 possible states, the greedy strategy reduces the number of candidates to less than 20 states
in all the cases. In 50% of the cases, there are 4 states or fewer that are still indistinguishable after
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Figure 6.4: Histogram of execution time for the greedy strategy.
Figure 6.5: Distribution of the number of indistinguishable states with the greedy strategy
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k steps. Using this metric of performance to compare greedy and brute force strategies, we can see
on Fig. 6.3 that the greedy strategy performs as well as the brute force. The graph shows the same
figures as Fig. 6.5, but re-shaped for an easier comparison. A point at coordinates (n,m) simply
means that in m% of the cases, there are n or less indistinguishable states after the strategy (greedy
or brute force) terminates.
6.5.2 Large Circuit Tests
In this section we test the greedy strategy on a larger circuit. This topology is representative of
more-electric aircraft power distribution systems with multiple generators and demonstrates how
abstraction can reduce the offline computation time. The circuit topology is shown in Fig. 6.6.
Contactors controlled by fault detection controller are depicted in blue. Applying the lossless ab-
straction method established in 6.4.2 leads to a reduced circuit in which four uncontrolled contactors
are eliminated. Comparing the offline computation for the full and reduced circuit, the that abstrac-
tion reduces the offline computation time by an order of magnitude (from 4000 seconds to 400
seconds).
We have also tested the greedy strategy on this circuit for a subset of Ω. Namely, we have selected
a standard functioning configuration of the contactors and considered all the possible valuations of
the other components, hence creating a subset of Ω. On this subset, the greedy strategy only with
k = 5 actions again performs as well as the brute force strategy. Results for the large circuit tests
are similar to those from the small circuit test, and thus figures are omitted.
6.6 Background Results in Submodularity
6.6.1 Definitions
We give some definitions and results on adaptive submodularity that follows the exposition provided
in [34] and [47]. Notations used here were defined in Subsections 6.2 and 6.2.2.
Definition 6.6.1 Given an objective function f , an action v ∈ V, and a partial realization ψt,
∆(v|ψt) is the conditional expected marginal benefit of v conditioned on having observed ψt, defined
as
∆(v|ψt) .= E[f(v0:t ∪ {v}, X)− f(v0:t, X)|ψt],
and the expectation taken with respect to P[x|ψt].
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Figure 6.6: A single-line diagram of a larger circuit with AC and DC components.
Definition 6.6.2 The function f : 2V×Y×Ω→ R+ is adaptive monotone with respect to distribution
P[x] if the conditional expected marginal benefit of any action is nonnegative. Thus, for all v ∈ V
and ψt with P[ψt] > 0,
∆(v|ψt) ≥ 0.
Definition 6.6.3 The function f : 2V×Y ×Ω→ R+ is adaptive submodular with respect to distribu-
tion P[x] if the conditional expected marginal benefit of any fixed action v does not increase as more
actions are performed and measurements are taken. Thus, f is adaptive submodular with respect to
distribution P[x] if for all ψt, ψt′ such that ψt is a subrealization of ψt′ , and for all v ∈ V\{v0, . . . , vt′},
∆(v|ψt) ≥ ∆(v|ψt′).
The adaptive greedy algorithm, a generalization of the greedy algorithm [47], is a strategy that
selects the action maximizing the conditional expected marginal benefit, conditioned on outcomes
from all previous actions.
Theorem 6.6.4 (Theorem 1.14 in [47]) Let pigreedyl be a greedy strategy run for l iterations (so
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that it selects l actions). Let pi∗k be any policy selecting at most k actions for any realization x. Then,
favg(pi
greedy
l ) ≥
(
1− e−l/k
)
favg(pi
∗
k),
where favg(pi)
.
= E[f(V˜ (pi,X), X)] is the expected reward of pi.
In particular, by setting k = l we see that the greedy strategy selecting k items step by step
obtains at least (1− 1/e) of the value of the optimal strategy that selects k items step by step.
6.6.2 Proofs
We first state a lemma that will be useful in the proof.
Lemma 6.6.5 The function b : RY → R, defined as
b(τ1, τ2, . . . , τY ) =
Y∑
i=1
τi −
∑Y
i=1 τ
2
i∑Y
i=1 τi
, (6.13)
is increasing on the positive orthant, i.e., b(τ1, τ2, . . . , τY ) ≥ b(s1, s2, . . . , sY ) if τi ≥ si ≥ 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ Y .
Proof: Note that because b is symmetric, i.e., permutation invariant with respect to its arguments, it
is enough to show that it is increasing in one of its arguments. Let k1
.
=
∑Y
i=2 τi and k2
.
=
∑Y
i=2 τ
2
i .
Define b˜(x) .= b(x, τ2, . . . , τY ) = k1 + x − k2+x2k1+x . The partial derivative of b with respect to state x
is ∂b˜/∂x = k
2
1+k2
(k1+x)2
, which is non-negative by definitions of k1 and k2. 
Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 6.3.2.
Consider two partial realizations ψt and ψt′ s.t ψt ⊆ ψt′ and the corresponding sets St and St′ .
Fix an action v ∈ V \v0:t′ . To prove adaptive submodularity, ∆(v, ψt) can be expressed as a function
dependent on the size of St. We examine the variation of ∆ between St and St′ .
Since the probability measure is non-uniform and can take values in some set {p1, . . . , pN}, we
define the subsets of Ω where P[x] is constant: Fn = {x ∈ Ω | P[x] = pn} for n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The
collection F1:N is trivially a partition of Ω. It is possible to show that the sets {D(y, v∗) ∩ Fn|y ∈
Y, n ∈ 1 : N} form a partition of Ω and thus a partition of St.
Let αn,y
.
= St ∩D(y, v) ∩ Fn. Then for all x ∈ αn,y, we have
µ(v, x) = y and P[x] = pn. (6.14)
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By Eq. (6.8) , we get a new expression for P[ψt]:
P[ψt] =
∑
x∈St
P[x] =
∑
y∈Y
∑
n∈1:N
pn|St ∩D(y, v) ∩ Fn|. (6.15)
Let τy
.
=
∑
n∈1:N pn|αn,y|. Then, conditional probabilities on Fn can be rewritten as
∀x ∈ Fn, P[x | ψt] = pn∑
y∈Y τy
. (6.16)
We then separately compute the two terms in Eq. (6.10). First term becomes:
E[f(v0:t, X) | ψt] =
∑
x0∈St
P[x0 | ψt]
∑
x∈h(v0:t,x0)
P[x]. (6.17)
For x0 ∈ St, h(v0:t, x0) = St, we obtain
E[f(v0:t, X) | ψt] =
∑
y∈Y
τy. (6.18)
For the second term in Eq. (6.10), we first get
f(v0:t ∪ {v}, x) =
∑
x˜∈h(v0:t,x)∩D(µ(v,x),x)
P[x˜]
= τµ(v,x).
From Eq. (6.14) and Eq. (6.16), we obtain:
E[f(v0:t ∪ {v}, X) | ψt] =
∑
x∈St
f(v0:t ∪ {v}, x)P[x | ψt]
=
∑
n∈1:N
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈αn,y
τy
pn∑
z∈Y τz
=
∑
y∈Y
τy∑
z∈Y τz
∑
n∈1:N
pn|αn,y|
=
∑
y∈Y
τ2y∑
z∈Y τz
.
Finally, putting the two terms of Eq. (6.10) leads to
∆(v|ψt) = b(τ1, τ2, . . . , τY ) =
Y∑
i=1
τi −
∑Y
i=1 τ
2
i∑Y
i=1 τi
, (6.19)
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where Y .= |Y|.
This expression of ∆(v|ψt) in terms of the variables τi is similar for the partial realization ψt′ ;
the only change is the set St, which is represented in the function b by a different value of the τi
denoted τ ′i . Since ψt ⊆ ψt′ and St′ ⊆ St, τi and τ ′i satisfy τ ′i 6 τi for all i.
Therefore, adaptive submodularity is equivalent to showing that b is increasing on the positive
orthant, and Lemma 6.6.5 concludes the proof.
6.7 Conclusions and Future Work
The current dynamic state estimation problem assumes that a single fault scenario, among a set
of possible scenarios, occurs and remains static throughout the entire greedy strategy implemen-
tation. Given sensor measurements, the greedy strategy outputs a set of possible system states,
or a localized state if possible. Currently, placement of sensors on the circuit topology is a given.
By changing the number and locations of sensors, however, it may be possible to improve state
estimation performance.
Given sensor and state knowledge, we can synthesize a reactive controller by framing the synthesis
problem as a two-player game with incomplete information. In [76], Reif shows that games with
incomplete information (i.e., sets of states that cannot be localized given sensor measurements) can
be transformed into games of perfect information. This is done by a powerset construction of states,
similar to subset construction in finite state automata. In this formulation, the worst-case scenario
is an exponential blow-up in state space. However, the sets of states are restricted given the sensor
knowledge from the dynamic state estimation problem.
Future work will integrate results from partial information games and synthesis of control proto-
cols that can react to dynamically changing faults with dynamic state estimation in order to configure
an optimal sensor placement. Exploring this design space and trade-offs therein are likewise topics
for future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary
This thesis addressed ways to design a system topology, formally and automatically specify re-
quirements, and synthesize reactive control protocols using an aircraft electric power system as a
representative application area. While current systems engineering relies on text-based specifications
and manual design, we combine formal methodologies from computer science and control in order
to create easier, more efficient, and verifiable ways to develop future control systems.
We demonstrated how text-based specifications can be converted into a temporal logic specifi-
cation language using a representative single-line diagram as an example. Given a set topology for
an electric power system and a set of system requirements formalized in linear temporal logic, we
automatically synthesized a control protocol for an electric power system on a more-electric aircraft.
The controller reacts to changes in the environment and is guaranteed, by construction, to satisfy
the desired properties even in the presence component (i.e., generator) failures. We synthesized a
centralized controller where statuses of all components are known, as well as distributed and decen-
tralized controllers by refining the overall system specifications. This refinement involves additional
assumptions and guarantees between subsystem interfaces (i.e., specifications on the components
that interact with other subsystems).
In specifying formal requirements, we have introduced a tool to automatically convert high-level
specifications into a formal specification language. We addressed techniques for synthesis of discrete-
variable, untimed and discrete-time control protocols. Scenario-based diagrams were shown to be
an additional way to specify system requirements. By utilizing a subset of diagrams referred to as
assume-guarantee live sequence charts, additional semantics allow for these visual-based charts to
be converted into GR(1) specifications and used to synthesize controllers. The limitations of timed
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synthesis tools has been discussed, and timed specifications have been converted into linear temporal
logic in order to utilize the capabilities of current tools.
In the area of design space exploration, we have applied methodology to the design of an air-
craft electric power system consisting of three main phases: topology synthesis, control synthesis,
and simulation-based design space exploration and verification. Central and controllers previously
synthesized are verified through real-time simulation as well as implemented on a hardware testbed.
By characterizing real-time hardware constraints, we can further refine our synthesis formulation
in order to better characterize timing requirements or evaluate how well a discretized-time prob-
lem can be translated into real-time simulations.To express system requirements, we adopt different
formalisms supported by specialized synthesis and analysis frameworks. To generate the system
topology, we cast a mixed integer-linear program that minimizes the overall cost while satisfying a
set of connectivity, power flow and reliability requirements, expressed in terms of linear arithmetic
constraints on Boolean variables and probabilistic constraints. To generate a correct-by-construction
controller for a given topology, we leverage results from reactive synthesis from linear temporal logic
specifications. We then refine these LTL specifications into signal-temporal logic constructs to assess
the real-time system performance and explore the design space at a lower abstraction level, based
on high fidelity behavioral models. Our compositional approach uses contracts to guarantee inde-
pendent implementability of system topology and control, since both topology synthesis and control
synthesis rely on a consistent set of models and design constraints.
Finally, we perform discrete state estimation using active control of switches within the electric
power system in a distributed control architecture. We formulated a greedy strategy implementa-
tion, which, for a given set of sensor measurements, outputs a set of possible system states, or a
localized state if possible. We provide a worst-performance bound for the greedy strategy, and detail
abstraction methods in order to reduce the size of the problem state space.
7.2 Future Work
Timing specifications in the electric power system problem are addressed with the use of clocks by
way of additional counter variables. This discretization of time further adds to the difficulties arising
from state space explosion. While capable of synthesizing large-scale timed systems, UPPAAL-
TIGA [11] is limited in the types of specifications and number of specifications it can handle. The
efficiency of these timed verification tools, is likewise still dependent on the number of clocks used
in the model. Other tools may be useful, and we are currently examining the ease and expressibility
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of other alternatives.
Another topic of future work is determining what level of abstraction is needed for modeling,
design, and specification. Control of the power quality from generators is considered at a continuous
level of abstraction. Load management and load shedding are considered at a discrete low-level of
abstraction. Both of these problems, although at different levels of abstraction, should be interfaced
with the primary distribution problem discussed earlier. The effects of transient voltages, significant
changes in addition or removal of loads, should be investigated within this framework. Due to the
nature of the electric power system design problem, continuous dynamics were able to be abstracted
away to a high-level logic problem. Other systems, such as the air-management system on aircraft,
are more highly coupled to dynamics. The influence of network effects, particularly at lower levels
of abstraction, is an area of interest.
To that effect, future work will also examine different the use of timed temporal logics in order
to capture specifications which may not be expressible using LTL or computation tree logic (CTL).
UPPAAL-TIGA can synthesize controllers with respect to timed specifications formalized in timed
computation tree logic (TCTL). Specifications, however, are limited to fragments of TCTL (i.e., no
nested quantifiers). We also plan to capture these specifications using LTL, with additional system
variables, in order to utilize the full range of LTL, which can be used in conjunction with other solvers,
such as Lily [40]. As a future work, we will extend our control synthesis algorithms to support richer
formal languages (e.g., timed logic, branching logic), continuous-time specifications and continuous
dynamics (e.g., transients, network and communication delays). The hardware testbed can likewise
be extended. Not only will more components be added, but also controllers synthesized from other
solvers, such as Lily, can be tested.
Furthermore, we also plan to directly use the domain-specific language and tool to automatically
convert assume-guarantee live sequence charts into specifications and synthesize a controller. Further
extensions include broadening the domain-specific language to include user-specific requirements that
may not be included in the high-level general specifications described earlier. With these kinds of
languages, however, the functionality is still limited to specific scenarios or types of requirements.
Generation specification from assume-guarantee live sequence charts are performed manually. While
tools, such as PlayGo [57] exist to synthesize controllers from a given live sequence chart, this does
not allow integration of live sequence chart specification with other system requirements. In other
words, assume-guarantee live sequence charts can be used for synthesis, but the control logic is
based solely on the charts themselves. We plan to extract the LTL specifications from PlayGo
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and integrate them with TuLiP. In addition, we are also exploring the use of PlayGo and domain-
specific languages for distributed controller protocols. Namely, how to distribute a given topology
among subsystems and generate interface specifications such that the overall system is realizable.
Lastly, the problem of network effects, including transients and delays, has been mostly ignored or
abstracted away within this problem formulation. Introducing specifications encompassing network
effects would be an additional feature for a domain-specific language.
In addition, given sensor and state knowledge, we can synthesize a reactive controller by fram-
ing the synthesis problem as a two-player game with incomplete information (i.e., sets of states
that cannot be localized given sensor measurements) by transforming them into games of perfect
information. This is done by a powerset construction of states, similar to subset construction in
finite state automata. In this formulation, the worst-case scenario is an exponential blow-up in state
space. However, the sets of states are restricted given the sensor knowledge from the dynamic state
estimation problem. Future work will integrate results from partial information games and synthesis
of control protocols that can react to dynamically changing faults with dynamic state estimation in
order to configure an optimal sensor placement. Exploring this design space and trade-offs therein
are likewise topics to consider.
Finally, we plan to investigate techniques for automatic generation of local contracts for the
synthesis of distributed and hierarchical control architectures. This can be integrated into the
domain-specific language, thus automatically generating contracts as well as specifications. These
techniques are not limited to the scope of electric power systems, and we plan to demonstrate the
usability to other application areas.
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